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Abstract. We show that, in environments with independent private values and
transferable utility, a privately informed principal can implement a contract that
is ex-ante optimal for her. As an application, we consider a bilateral exchange
environment (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) in which the principal is one of
the traders. If the property rights over the good are dispersed among the traders,
the principal will implement a contract in which she is almost surely better off
than if there were no uncertainty about her information. The optimal contract is a
combination of a participation fee, a buyout option for the principal, and a resale
stage with posted prices and, hence, is a generalization of the posted price that would
be optimal if the principal’s valuation were commonly known. We also provide a
condition under which the principal implements the same contract regardless of
whether the agents know her information or not.
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1. Introduction
The optimal design of contracts and institutions in the presence of privately in-
formed market participants is central to economics, with applications including auc-
tions, procurement, public good provision, organizational contract design, legislative
bargaining, etc.. A restriction in much of this theory is that a contract or a mecha-
nism is designed by a party who has no private information. As such, the theory is
not applicable to a large set of environments in which contracts or institutions arise
endogenously as a choice of privately informed agents such as in, e.g., collusion, resale,
contract renegotiation, bargaining over arbitration procedures, design of international
agreements, etc..
In this paper, we study the model in which the contract is selected by one of
the privately informed market participants (principal) subject to the agreement by
the others (agents). This is a signaling game in which the choice of a contract is
a signal about the principal’s private information (her type). The value for the
principal of any contract is determined endogenously depending on the agents’ belief
and the continuation play assigned in equilibrium to the contract. Unlike in standard
signaling games, the principal’s strategy space is enormous and does not possess a nice
structure. So far, except for several restricted environments, the informed principal
games have been intractable.
We provide a solution to the informed-principal problem in the classic environment
with independent private values and monetary transfers. Since the principal has
private information, she might want to conceal this information from the agents at the
moment of contract selection and become a player in the game induced by the contract
she selects. If this occurs, the agents’ belief about the principal’s type translates into
their belief about the principal’s actions in this game and affect the agents’ calculation
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of the optimal strategy. This is so even though the values are private and the agents’
payoffs do not directly depend on the belief about the principal’s information.
Nevertheless, the literature has identified a number of independent-private-values
environments in which the principal cannot benefit from concealing her information
and any equilibrium of the informed-principal game is outcome-equivalent to a col-
lection of contracts that would be optimal if the type of the principal were commonly
known (Myerson 1985, Maskin and Tirole 1990, Tan 1996, Yilankaya 1999, Balestrieri
2008, Skreta 2009). In these environments, the outcomes of the contracts that would
be selected by the principal in three different informational environments, before the
principal learns her information, if she is privately informed, and if her information
is common knowledge among the agents, coincide:1
Environments identified in the literature:
Ex-ante contract⇔ Interim (informed-principal) contract⇔ Ex-post contract
and the informed-principal problem is trivial.
In general, however, this equivalence fails (see Fleckinger 2007 and Section 7 in this
paper). Intuitively, the agents’ uncertainty about the principal type might allow the
principal to extract a higher surplus from the agents through relaxing their individual-
rationality constraints.2
In the environments in which the principal can benefit from concealing her infor-
mation from the agents, the informed-principal problem becomes complex and so far
has been intractable. The difficulty is that at the moment of contract selection the
principal would like to implement a contract that maximizes her payoff given the real-
ized type. Contracts, however, will differ in how they distribute the surplus across the
principal types and hence different types would like to choose different contracts. Yet,
if different contracts are selected in equilibrium, the principal’s type will be revealed
to the agents and the principal won’t be able to benefit from the agents’ uncertainty
about her type.
Our main result (Proposition 2) is the existence of the pooling equilibrium in an
informed-principal game that implements an ex-ante optimal contract: All principal
1In all three environments, the contract is executed after the principal and the agents learn their
types. Hence, the contract can condition both on the reports of the principal and the agents. The
only difference between the environments is the principal’s and the agents’ beliefs at the moment
of contract selection. The ex-ante contract is selected when both the agents and the principal
share prior beliefs about the principal’s type, the interim contract is selected when the principal
has privately learned her type and the agents hold prior beliefs about the principal’s type, and the
ex-post contract is selected when the principal’s type is commonly known.
2Manelli and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (forthcom-
ing) show that in linear independent private values environments Bayesian incentive compatible
allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies; this implies that the uncertainty about
the principal’s type cannot benefit her through the channel of relaxing the incentive compatibility
constraints.
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types select the same contract that maximizes the principal’s weighted expected pay-
off, where the weights are given by the agents’ prior belief about the distribution of
principal types:
This paper − > all independent-private-values environments with transfers:
Ex-ante contract⇔ Interim (informed-principal) contract< Ex-post contract
Hence, in environments in which the principal can benefit from keeping her infor-
mation private, different principal types can jointly realize the entire available surplus
even though they have conflicting preferences at the moment of contract selection.
The ex-ante optimality result means that it is possible to simultaneously (i) max-
imize the expected payoff of all principal types and (ii) prevent each type of the
principal from deviating to contracts that favor this type at the expense of destroying
(disproportionally more) surplus of the other types. (The ex-ante optimality result,
in general, fails in the environments without transfers; see Section 3 in the working
paper version of this paper.)
This equilibrium outcome can be obtained by maximization of the principal’s ex-
ante expected payoff subject to interim incentive compatibility and individual ra-
tionality constraints. Hence, the ex-ante optimality result reduces the analysis of a
complex informed-principal signaling game to a linear maximization program that
can be solved using standard methods; it connects the informed-principal problem to
the standard mechanism design approach, overcoming intractability issues.
The ex-ante optimality result can be easily applied to diverse environments such
as, e.g., public good provision, multiunit or multigood auctions, collusion, legisla-
tive bargaining and voting, speculative trade, assignment problems, matching with
transferable utility, etc.
We also obtain a general sufficient condition under which that the privacy of the
principal’s information is irrelevant: monotonicity of each agent’s payoff in his type
for any outcome. This result generalizes and clarifies the logic underlying the ex-
isting results in the literature (Myerson 1985, Maskin and Tirole 1990, Tan 1996,
Yilankaya 1999, Balestrieri 2008, Skreta 2009). The irrelevance of the principal’s
private information in linear environments with monotonic payoffs shows that the
informed-principal problem can indeed be ignored in many applications.
Nevertheless, the monotonicity of payoffs is not generic and the privacy of the
principal’s information will, in general, affect the outcome. As an application of our
ex-ante optimality result, we focus on a linear environment with two outcomes in
which each player is privately informed about their preferences over the outcomes.
This environment has multiple interpretations, including bilateral trade, monopoly
with an outside option for the buyer, trade in differentiated goods, and renegotiation
of a labor contract, among others. In this environment, the principal can benefit from
the privacy of her type and will implement a contract in which interim she is almost
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surely better off than if her type is commonly known if and only if the players’ payoffs
are non-monotonic.
For concreteness, we focus on the bilateral exchange interpretation of the environ-
ment in which the players are traders (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)) and one
of the traders is designated as the principal.3 In this application, the payoffs are
non-monotonic if and only if the property rights over the good are dispersed among
the traders.
We also discuss an indirect implementation of the ex-ante optimal contract for
bilateral exchange environments. Its structure is novel and of independent interest.
The contract can be implemented via a combination of a participation fee for the
agent, a buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices. In the
first stage, the agent pays the participation fee and the good is tentatively allocated
to the agent. In the second stage, the principal decides whether to exercise a buyout
option, in which case the good becomes tentatively allocated to the principal. In
the third stage, given the tentative allocation of property rights, the principal makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent to sell or buy the good. The first two stages
consolidate the originally dispersed property rights over the good and allocate them
either to the principal or the agent, determining whether the principal becomes the
seller or the buyer in the third stage.
An important literature is devoted to showing optimality of posted prices in bi-
lateral exchange environments (Riley and Zeckhauser 1983, Myerson 1985, Williams
1987, Yilankaya 1999). Our results indicate that uncertainty about the principal’s
valuation may generate more complex and interesting contracts. These contracts,
nevertheless, are a generalization of a posted price contract that would be optimal
in the environments with the extreme property rights allocation in which either the
principal or the agent own the good.
1.1. Related literature on private values. The problem of mechanism-selection
by an informed principal was introduced by Myerson (1983). He uses an axiomatic
approach to define a solution and shows that it is always consistent with sequential
equilibrium play in a mechanism-selection game. Unfortunately, the characteriza-
tion in Myerson is abstract. Furthermore, his environment excludes the quasilinear
environments studied here.
Maskin and Tirole (1990) consider mechanism-selection by an informed principal
in a class of environments with independent private values under a number of specific
structural assumptions. The focus of Maskin and Tirole (1990) is on risk-averse
players. In their model, if players are risk-neutral so that utility is fully transferable,
a privately informed principal uses the same mechanism as when her information is
3This environment is equivalent to a partnership dissolution problem (Cramton, Gibbons, and
Klemperer 1987) in which one of the parties selects a dissolution mechanism subject to the approval
of the mechanism by the other party. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) have focused on
conditions for ex-post efficient implementation. The informed principal, however, will maximize the
expected revenue and will distort the allocation from the efficient one to minimize the information
rents she has to leave to the agent.
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public and the equivalence between the ex-ante optimal and the separating outcomes
attains. Similar results are obtained in Myerson (1985), Tan (1996), Yilankaya (1999),
Balestrieri (2008), and Skreta (2009). In the application studied in this paper, this
“irrelevance” result is non-generic. In bilateral exchange environment, it holds if
and only if the property rights are extreme, i.e., one of the parties owns the entire
good. For non-extreme allocation of property rights, the principal is almost surely
better off in the ex-ante optimal allocation than if her type is commonly known. In the
literature, the first example with private values and transferable utility in which there
exists a mechanism in which the principal can gain from privacy of her information
is due to Fleckinger (2007).
1.2. Relationship to Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012). Characterizing the entire
set of equilibria in the informed principal-game is typically infeasible due to the com-
plexity of the strategy space of the principal. The standard approach in the literature,
instead, is to identify certain properties of a mechanism that ensure that it can be
supported as an equilibrium outcome. The relevant property for the environments
with private values is strong neologism-proofness: All equilibrium outcomes of the
informed principal game found in the literature in these environments are strongly
neologism-proof. An equilibrium outcome is strongly neologism-proof if no type of the
principal can gain from proposing an alternative mechanism that is incentive compati-
ble and individually rational given any belief about the principal that puts probability
0 on types that would strictly lose from proposing the alternative. Strong neologism-
proofness is a generalization of the concept of “strongly unconstrained Pareto opti-
mal” (SUPO) allocations of Maskin and Tirole (1990) and is related to some of the
concepts in Myerson (1983) (Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012)).
In Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012), we establish existence of a strongly neologism-
proof allocation in a large class of private value environments. The existence is
obtained by generalizing the approach by Maskin and Tirole (1990) of considering a
fictitious slack-exchange economy in which each type of the principal is a trader in the
agents’ participation and incentive compatibility constraints. This approach provides
an abstract characterization in terms of incentive constraints or convex polyhedra
that is computationally convenient, but that entails no economic intuition that would
be useful for concrete applications. In particular, it is not helpful towards obtaining
the ex-ante optimality result.4 In this paper, we derive an envelope characterization
of the strongly neologism-proof allocations in quasilinear environments. This char-
acterization is obtained using methods different from the slack-exchange approach.
The ex-ante optimality result is an implication of this characterization. The char-
acterization is as follows. Let T0 denote the principal’s type space and let U
ρ
0 (t0)
denote the expected payoff of any principal type t0 in any allocation ρ. Let p0 be the
prior belief about the principal’s type. An incentive-feasible allocation ρ is strongly
4Furthermore, this approach does not immediately apply to the environments considered in this
paper because the space of monetary transfers is unbounded.
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neologism-proof if and only if
η(q0) ≤
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0) for all q0 absolutely continuous rel. to p0, (1)
where η(q0) is the principal’s ex-ante optimal payoff given the belief q0 about the
principal, i.e., the maximal expected payoff on the set of allocations that are incentive-
feasible with respect to q0 and prior beliefs about the agents’ types.
This is a rather restrictive condition that requires the principal’s expected payoff
in the allocation corresponding to ρ, when weighed according to q0, to be not less
than the total expected surplus available to the principal if q0 reflects the agents’
belief about the principal, and this condition must hold for all q0 that are absolutely
continuous relative to the prior belief about the principal p0.
Condition (1) simplifies the expression of strong neologism-proofness considerably:
instead of having to compare the principal’s payoff in different allocations separately
for each of her types, it is sufficient to consider her ex-ante expected payoff in different
allocations.
1.3. Other related literature. Mechanism-selection by an informed principal in
environments with common values was first considered by Myerson (1985) and Maskin
and Tirole (1992). In environments with correlated types and a single agent, Cella
(2008) shows that the principal benefits from the privacy of her information and
Skreta (2009) discuses the optimal disclosure policy for the principal. With correlated
types and multiple agents, Severinov (2008) provides an intriguing construction that
allows the informed principal to extract the entire surplus. Balkenborg and Makris
(2010) look at common value environments and provide a novel characterization of a
solution to the informed principal problem. Izmalkov and Balestrieri (2012) study the
problem of the informed principal in an environment with horizontally differentiated
goods, where the principal is privately informed about the characteristic of the good.
Halac (2012) considers optimal relational contracts in a repeated setting where the
principal has persistent private information about her outside option. Nishimura
(2012) analyzes properties of scoring procurement auctions in an independent private
value environment with multidimensional quality and a privately informed buyer.
An informed principal problem arises in Francetich and Troyan (2012) who study
endogenous collusion agreements in auctions with interdependent values.
Finally, there exists a separate literature that studies the informed-principal prob-
lem in moral-hazard environments, rather than in adverse-selection environments con-
sidered here (see, for example, Beaudry (1994), Jost (1996), Bond and Gresik (1997),
Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000), Chade and Silvers (2002), and Kaya (2010)).
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the basic concepts of our
model. Section 3 characterizes strongly neologism-proof allocations. The ex-ante
optimality result is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we characterize ex-ante
optimal allocations in linear-utility environments. Section 6 provides a condition
under which the outcome is independent of whether the agents know the principal’s
information. The characterization of ex-ante optimal allocations is applied in Section
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7 to a class of bilateral-trade environments. Proof details and some additional results
are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Model
2.1. Environment. Consider players i = 0, . . . , n who have to collectively choose
from a space of basic outcomes
Z = A× IRn,
where the measurable space A represents a set of verifiable collective actions, and IRn
is the set of vectors of agents’ payments. For example, in an environment where the
collective action is the allocation of a single unit of a private good among the players,
A = {0, . . . , n}, indicating who obtains the good.
Every player i has a type ti ∈ Ti that captures her private information. A player’s
type space Ti may be any compact metric space. The product of players’ type spaces
is denoted T = T0 × · · · × Tn. The types t0, . . . , tn are realizations of stochastically
independent Borel probability measures p0, . . . , pn with supp(pi) = Ti for all i. The
probability of any Borel set B ⊆ Ti of player-i types is denoted pi(B).
Player i’s payoff function is denoted
ui : Z × Ti → IR.
We consider private-value environments with quasi-linear payoff functions,
u0(a,x, t0) = v0(a, t0) + x1 + · · ·+ xn,
ui(a,x, ti) = vi(a, ti)− xi,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), and v0, . . . , vn are called valuation functions. We assume
that the family of functions (vi(a, ·))a∈A is equi-continuous for all i (observe that this
assumption is void if type spaces are finite).
The players’ interaction results in an outcome that is a probability measure on the
set of basic outcomes; the set of outcomes is denoted
Z = A× IRn,
where A denotes the set of probability measures on A, and IRn is the vector of the
agents’ expected payments.
If the players cannot agree on an outcome, some exogenously given disagreement
outcome z obtains. The disagreement outcome z = (α, 0, . . . , 0) for some (possibly
random) collective action α ∈ A. We normalize the valuation functions such that
each player’s expected valuation from the disagreement outcome equals 0, that is,∫
A
vi(a, ti)dα(a) = 0 for all i and ti. This is without loss of generality since we can
always subtract the disagreement payoffs from the payoffs from the basic outcomes.
A player’s (expected) payoff from any outcome (α,x) ∈ Z is denoted
ui(α,x, ti) =
∫
A
vi(a, ti)dα(a)− xi,
where x0 = −x1 − · · · − xn.
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An allocation is a complete type-dependent description of the result of the players’
interaction; it is described by a map
ρ(·) = (α(·),x(·)) : T→ Z
such that payments are uniformly bounded (that is, supt∈T ||x(t)|| <∞, to guarantee
integrability) and such that the appropriate measurability restrictions are satisfied
(that is, for any measurable set B ⊆ A, the map T → IR, t 7→ α(t)(B) is Borel
measurable, and x(·) is Borel measurable).
An allocation describes the outcome of the informed principal problem as a function
of the type profile. Alternatively, an allocation ρ can be interpreted as a direct mech-
anism, where the players i = 0, . . . , n simultaneously announce types tˆi (=messages),
and the outcome ρ(tˆ0, . . . , tˆn) is implemented.
Our analysis focuses on the outcome of the informed principal problem as captured
by allocations and abstracts from the specific mechanisms chosen by the principal.
An allocation can be implemented by multiple mechanisms and some allocations can
be implemented both in pooling equilibria in which all types of the principal offer the
same mechanisms and in separating or semi-separating equilibria in which different
types of the principal offer distinct mechanisms.
2.2. Linear-utility environments. A common assumption in the literature is that
each player’s valuation function depends linearly on her type. We say that the en-
vironment has linear utilities if (i) the set of basic collective actions is finite (A =
{1, . . . , |A|}), (ii) each player’s type space is an interval (Ti = [ti, ti]), (iii) each player’s
valuation function vi(a, ti) is an affine function of ti, for all a ∈ A (that is, there exist
numbers sai and c
a
i such that vi(a, ti) = s
a
i ti + c
a
i ), (iv) there exists of a strictly pos-
itive and continuous density fi for each player’s type distribution pi (and we use Fi
to denote the c.d.f.), (v) the disagreement outcome (α, 0, . . . , 0) is such that, for all
i,
∫
A
sai dα(a) = 0 and
∫
A
cai dα(a) = 0, and (vi)
∀i ≥ 1 ∃ai, bi ∈ A : saii 6= sbii . (2)
Observe that (v) is not a substantial restriction, but simply expresses that disagree-
ment payoffs are normalized to 0, and (vi) restricts attention to players i ≥ 1 whose
preferences over outcomes actually depend on their private information.
Linear-utility environments provide useful models for many applications, including
bilateral exchange, single and multi-unit auctions, procurement, public good provi-
sion, non-linear pricing, franchise, legislative bargaining, and assignment problems
with transferable utility.5
5For some recent papers using linear environments see, e.g., Che and Kim (2006), Ledyard and
Palfrey (2007), Eliaz and Spiegler (2007), Hafalir and Krishna (2008), Pavlov (2008), Figueroa and
Skreta (2009), Garratt, Tro¨ger, and Zheng (2009), Celik (2009), Kirkegaard (2009), Lebrun (2009),
Manelli and Vincent (2010), Kra¨hmer (2012), and Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi
(forthcoming).
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2.3. Strongly neologism-proof allocation and equilibrium. One of the players
is designated as the proposer of the allocation. We will assume from now on that the
proposer is player 0. We call her the principal; the other players are called agents.
Given the presence of private information, incentive and participation constraints
will play a major role in our analysis. Expected payoffs are computed with respect to
the prior beliefs p1, . . . , pn about the agents’ types. However, during the interaction
the agents may update their belief about the principal’s type, away from the prior
p0. Let q0 denote a Borel probability measure on T0 that represents the agents’ belief
about the principal’s type. For our purposes it is enough to work with a belief q0 that
is either absolutely continuous relative to p0 or is a point belief.
Given an allocation ρ and a belief q0, the expected payoff of type ti of player i if
she announces type tˆi is denoted
6
Uρ,q0i (tˆi, ti) =
∫
T−i
ui(ρ(tˆi, t−i), ti)dq−i(t−i),
where q−i denotes the product measure obtained from deleting dimension i of q0, p1, . . . , pn.
The expected payoff of type ti of player i from allocation ρ is
Uρ,q0i (ti) = U
ρ,q0
i (ti, ti).
We will use the shortcut Uρ0 (t0) = U
ρ,q0
0 (t0), which is justified by the fact that the
principal’s expected payoff is independent of q0.
An allocation ρ is called q0-feasible if, for all players i, the q0-incentive constraints
(3) and the q0-participation constraints (4) are satisfied,
∀ti, tˆi ∈ Ti : Uρ,q0i (ti) ≥ Uρ,q0i (tˆi, ti), (3)
∀ti ∈ Ti : Uρ,q0i (ti) ≥ 0. (4)
Given allocations ρ and ρ′ and a belief q0, we say that ρ is q0-dominated by ρ′ if ρ′ is
q0-feasible and
∀t0 ∈ supp(q0) : Uρ′0 (t0) ≥ Uρ0 (t0),
∃B ⊆ supp(q0), q0(B) > 0 ∀t0 ∈ B : Uρ′0 (t0) > Uρ0 (t0).
The domination is strict if “>” holds for all t0 ∈ supp(q0).
Characterizing the entire set of equilibria in the informed principal game is typ-
ically infeasible due to the complexity of the strategy space of the principal. The
standard approach in the literature, instead, is to identify certain properties of a
mechanism that ensure that it can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. The rele-
vant property for the environments with private values is strong neologism-proofness.
Strong neologism-proofness is a generalization of the concept of “strongly uncon-
strained Pareto optimal” (SUPO) allocations of Maskin and Tirole (1990) and is
related to some of the concepts in Myerson (1983) (Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012)).
6Here and throughout the paper the principal’s beliefs about the agents are held constant and
are, consequently, suppressed in the notation.
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Definition 1. An allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if (i) ρ is p0-feasible and
(ii) ρ is not q0-dominated for any belief q0 that is absolutely continuous relative to p0.
2.4. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The following simple argument from Mylo-
vanov and Tro¨ger (2012) shows that such allocations are consistent with equilibrium
play in a non-cooperative mechanism-selection game. Consider the principal’s choice
between either obtaining the payoff from a given strongly neologism-proof allocation
or proposing any alternative mechanism. Suppose that some types of the principal
propose the alternative mechanism. By Bayesian rationality, this mechanism imple-
ments an allocation that is incentive-feasible given a belief that puts probability 0 on
the set of types that would strictly lose from proposing the alternative. By definition
of strong neologism-proofness, then, no type of the principal has a strict incentive to
propose the alternative.7 Hence, by proposing the strongly neologism-proof allocation
as a direct mechanism the principal can solve her mechanism-selection problem.
If types are finite, we consider a mechanism-selection game in which any finite
game form with perfect recall may be proposed as a mechanism (cf. Myerson (1983),
Maskin and Tirole (1990)); with non-finite type spaces, the game interpretation is
informal as there is no “natural” set of feasible mechanisms, nor is there an obvious
choice for the definition of equilibrium.
2.5. Ex-ante optimal allocations. A core point of our paper will be that strong
neologism-proofness is closely related to the ex-ante optimality of an allocation. For
any belief q0, the problem of maximizing the principal’s q0-ex-ante expected payoff
across all allocations that are q0-feasible is
max
ρ q0-feasible
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0). (5)
Let η(q0) denote the supremum value of the problem. In general, a maximum may fail
to exist. This may be because arbitrarily high payoffs can be achieved (η(q0) = ∞),
or because the supremum cannot be achieved exactly.
Definition 2. An allocation ρ is ex-ante optimal if it solves problem (5) with q0 = p0.
Note that any ex-ante optimal allocation is p0-feasible and, in particular, satisfies
the principal’s incentive constraints.
3. Characterization of strong neologism-proofness
The main result in this section is a characterization of strong neologism-proofness
in quasi-linear environments. We show that strong neologism-proofness requires, for
all beliefs q0 that are absolutely continuous with respect to the prior p0, that the
principal’s highest possible q0-ex-ante expected payoff cannot exceed the q0-ex-ante
expectation of the vector of her strongly neologism-proof payoffs. This envelope
characterization greatly simplifies the expression of strong neologism-proofness; it
plays a central role in our analysis.
7Myerson (1983, Theorem 2) uses a related argument to show that his concept of a strong solution
is consistent with equilibrium play.
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Proposition 1. A p0-feasible allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if and only if
η(q0) ≤
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0) for all q0 absolutely continuous rel. to p0. (6)
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Figure 1. Illustration of condition (6) for T0 = {t′0, t′′0}. Let ρ and
ρ′ be two strongly neologism-proof allocations and p0 and p′0 be the
corresponding prior beliefs. The brown and the blue areas are the
regions of incentive feasible principal-type payoff vectors for prior beliefs
p0 and p
′
0 respectively. By (6),∫
T0
Uρ
′
0 (t0)dp0(t0) ≥
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dp0(t0) = η(p0),∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dp
′
0(t0) ≥
∫
T0
Uρ
′
0 (t0)dp
′
0(t0) = η(p
′
0).
We prove the “if” part by showing the counterfactual, which is simple: an allocation
that q0-dominates ρ also yields a strictly higher q0-ex-ante-expected payoff, and η(q0)
is, by definition, not smaller than this payoff.
To prove “only if”, we again show the counterfactual. That is, we suppose that,
given a strongly neologism-proof allocation ρ, there exists a belief q0 such that (6) fails.
By definition of η(q0), there exists a q0-feasible allocation ρ
′ with a strictly higher q0-
ex-ante-expected payoff than ρ. Starting with ρ′, by redistributing payments between
principal-types we can construct an allocation ρ′′ such that each principal-type is
strictly better off than in ρ. This may lead, however, to a violation of a principal-
type’s incentive constraint in ρ′′. The remaining, more difficult, part of the proof
consists in resurrecting the principal’s incentive constraints.
We find a belief r0 and an allocation σ that r0-dominates ρ, thereby showing that ρ
is not strongly neologism-proof. Starting with the belief q0 and the allocation ρ
′′, this
can be imagined as being achieved by altering the allocation and the belief multiple
times in a procedure that ends with r0 and σ after finitely many steps.
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In environments with finite type spaces, the procedure can be imagined as follows.
Suppose ρ′′ violates the incentive constraint of some principal-type. We may restrict
attention here to types in the support of q0 (all other types may be assumed to an-
nounce whatever type is optimal among the type announcements in the support of
q0). Alter ρ
′′ by giving the type with the violated constraint a different allocation:
the average over what she had and what she is attracted to. Alter q0 by adding to
her previous probability the probability of the type that she was attracted to, and
assign this type probability 0. From the viewpoint of the agents (i.e., in expectation
over the principal’s types), the new allocation together with the new belief is indistin-
guishable from the old one together with the old belief. Moreover, the new belief has
a smaller support. Repeating this procedure leads to smaller and smaller supports,
until incentive compatibility is satisfied.
The procedure is more complicated in environments with non-finite type spaces.
First, we partition the principal’s type space into a finite number of small cells such
that when we replace in each cell the allocation by its average across the cell, then
the new allocation ρ′′′ is q0-almost surely better than ρ. The crucial property of
the new allocation is that, in the direct-mechanism interpretation, there exist only
finitely many essentially different announcements of principal-types. In summary,
ρ′′′ belongs to the set E of all allocations that (i) have this finiteness property, and
(ii) are r0-almost surely better for the principal than ρ, where (iii) r0 is any belief
such that the agents’ r0-incentive and participation constraints are satisfied (while
the principal’s constraints are not necessarily satisfied). We consider an allocation σ∗
in E that is minimal with respect to the finiteness property (that is, it is not possible
to further reduce the number of essentially different principal-type announcements
without violating (ii) or (iii)). Using the averaging idea from the finite-type world,
we show that σ∗ satisfies the principal’s incentive constraints r0-almost surely. Hence,
we can construct an r0-feasible allocation σ by altering σ
∗ on an r0-probability-0 set.
Using continuity and the fact that property (ii) holds for σ∗, we conclude that ρ is
r0-dominated by σ.
The complete proof is in the appendix.
Remark 1. In the appendix (Section 9.3), we show that a strongly neologism-proof
allocation exists under weak technical assumptions if the type spaces are finite, and
exists in any linear environment.
These existence results build on the existence result proved in Mylovanov and
Tro¨ger (2012). Stochastic independence between the principal’s and the agents’ types
is required for these existence results. Stochastic independence between the agents’
types can be dropped if the type spaces are finite and it is not required for the proof
of Proposition 1.
4. Ex-ante optimality of strongly neologism-proof allocations
If we set q0 = p0 in Proposition 1, we can conclude
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Proposition 2. Any strongly neologism-proof allocation is ex-ante optimal.
The significance of this result is that it connects the complex informed principal
problem to the standard mechanism design approach that can be used to character-
ize ex-ante optimal mechanisms making the informed principal problem tractable in
applications.
This result is most convenient in environments where the ex-ante optimal payoffs
are unique (such as many environments with continuous type spaces): in such en-
vironments there is an essentially unique candidate for a strongly neologism-proof
allocation.
Proposition 2 also implies that the issue of the principal’s information leakage
through the choice of the mechanism imposes no cost on the principal in terms of
the total surplus she realizes in equilibrium: Different principal types, despite their
conflict of preference about how to allocate the available surplus, can coordinate on
a mechanism that maximizes their ex-ante expected total surplus.
A further implication of this result is that in the environments in which the principal
learns her type over time, the principal is indifferent about whether to write an ex-
ante (long-term) contract or offer a (short-term) contract after her information is
realized; this might explain why sometimes we do not observe complete long-term
contracts.
5. Ex-ante optimality in linear-utility environments
In this section, we provide a characterization of ex-ante optimality in linear-utility
environments. Importantly, in contrast to the main characterization result in Ledyard
and Palfrey (2007), we do not restrict attention to environments with monotonic
payoffs (cf. Definition 4 below). Allowing non-monotonicities is crucial for many
of the applications because it amounts to allowing arbitrary disagreement outcomes.
Technically, the challenge arising from non-monotonicities is that the participation
constraint is not necessarily binding for the lowest agent type.8
In a linear-utility environment, the payoff-relevant aspects of the collective-action
choice are captured by the set
V = {(sˆ0, . . . , sˆn, cˆ0, . . . , cˆn) ∈ IR2n+2 | ∃α ∈ A ∀i : sˆi =
∫
A
sai dα(a), cˆi =
∫
A
cai dα(a)}.
Therefore, we can think of an allocation as directly determining a vector (s0(t), . . . , cn(t)) ∈
V for any type profile t. Also, instead of determining payments we can think of an
allocation as directly determining the players’ utilities u0(t), . . . , un(t) (a player’s
payment is then given by si(t)ti + ci(t)− ui(t)).
8Formally, this is equivalent to allowing linear type-dependent disagreement payoffs. Jullien
(2000) analyzes mechanism design with linear and non-linear type-dependent disagreement payoffs,
but in his model there is only one agent and the principal has no private information.
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We also use the following shortcuts
si(ti) =
∫
T−i
si(t)dF−i(t−i),
ci(ti) =
∫
T−i
ci(t)dF−i(t−i),
ui(ti) =
∫
T−i
ui(t)dF−i(t−i).
For all i ≥ 1 and c.d.f.s z∗i (·) on Ti, define the virtual valuation function
ψ
z∗i
i (ti) = ti −
z∗i (ti)− F (ti)
fi(ti)
(ti ∈ Ti).
The ironed virtual valuation ψ
z∗i
i is defined as follows.
9 Let
Hi(q) =
∫ q
0
ψ
z∗i
i (F
−1
i (r))dr (q ∈ [0, 1]).
Let H i denote the convex hull of Hi. Because H i is convex, its derivative exists
Lebesgue-a.e. and is weakly increasing; let H
′
i be a weakly increasing extension to
[0, 1] and define
ψ
z∗i
i (ti) = H
′
i(Fi(ti)).
One can think of ψ
z∗i
i (·) as constructed by ironing the non-monotonicities of ψz
∗
i
i (·).
We characterize ex-ante optimality in terms of virtual-surplus maximization. For
all v = (sˆ0, . . . , cˆn) ∈ V and t ∈ T, define the virtual surplus function
V z
∗
1 ,...,z
∗
n(v, t) = sˆ0t0 + cˆ0 +
n∑
i=1
sˆiψ
z∗i
i (ti) + cˆi. (7)
Here is the existence and characterization result.10
Proposition 3. In any linear-utility environment, an ex-ante optimal allocation ex-
ists. An allocation u0(t), . . . , un(t), s0(t), . . . , cn(t) is ex-ante optimal if and only if
there exist c.d.f.s z∗i on Ti (i = 1, . . . , n) such that the following conditions hold:
∀i ≥ 1, ti ∈ supp(z∗i ) : ui(ti) = 0, (8)
(s0(t), . . . , cn(t)) ∈ arg max
v∈V
V z
∗
1 ,...,z
∗
n(v, t), a.e. t, (9)
si(·) is weakly increasing for all i ≥ 0, (10)
ui(ti) = ui(ti) +
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dy for all i ≥ 0, ti ∈ Ti. (11)
ui(ti) ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 0, ti ∈ Ti. (12)
9The construction follows Myerson (1981), who considered the case z∗i (ti) = 1.
10The if-and-only-if part of this result holds for arbitrary c.d.f.s F0 on T0; the assumptions con-
cerning smoothness of F0 are not needed.
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The core part of the conditions is the virtual-surplus maximization (9). If this
maximization problem has a unique solution, then si(t) is automatically weakly in-
creasing in ti, for any t−i; in general, however, (10) is an independent condition. The
Lagrange multiplier functions z∗i indicate which agent types’ participation conditions
have bite; condition (8) requires that z∗i puts all its mass on types for which the par-
ticipation constraint is binding. The envelope condition (11) requires that payments
are chosen such that all players’ incentive constraints are satisfied. The participation
constraints are (12).
The proof of Proposition 3 begins with the observation that the solutions to the
principal’s F0-ex-ante problem are precisely the solutions to the principal’s relaxed
F0-ex-ante problem in which the principal’s incentive and participation constraints are
satisfied (cf. Proposition 9 and Corollary 2). In order to characterize the solutions
to the relaxed problem, we take a Lagrangian approach. The crucial insight is to
take a Lagrangian approach only with respect to the agents’ participation constraints
(30), and not with respect to the monotonicity constraints (28). The monotonicity
constraints are treated with a generalization of the ironing techniques of Myerson
(1981). The details are in the appendix.
6. Irrelevance of privacy of the principal’s information
Proposition 1 also implies that the question of whether or not the principal benefits
from the uncertainty about her information or, equivalently, offers an allocation that
differs from what she would if her information were commonly known (“best separable
allocation”) boils down to the question of whether or not a best separable allocation
is ex-ante optimal for various beliefs about the principal’s type, as stated in the
proposition below.
Definition 3. An allocation ρ is best separable if, for all point beliefs q0, ρ is q0-
feasible and ρ is not q0-dominated.
Observe that the concept of a best separable allocation11 is entirely independent of
the agent’s prior belief p0. The principal would optimally propose a best separable
allocation if her type were commonly known, that is, if the agents did have a point
belief about the principal’s type. Equivalently, a best separable allocation will be
selected if the principal is restricted to offer a mechanism in which she is not a player
herself.12,13
11Maskin and Tirole (1990) use the term full-information optimal allocation instead.
12Zheng (2002) calls such mechanisms “transparent”.
13In independent-private-values environments, a best separable allocation which is not p0-
dominated is a strong solution (Myerson 1983). By definition of strong neologism proofness, a
strongly neologism-proof allocation cannot be dominated by a best separable allocation, while a
best separable allocation ρ is a strong solution if it is strongly neologism-proof. Moreover, a best
separable allocation is the only candidate for a strong solution. If both a strongly neologism-proof
allocation and a strong solution exist, then they lead to the same principal-type payoff vector.
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Proposition 4. A best separable allocation is strongly neologism-proof if and only if
it solves problem (5) for all q0 that are absolutely continuous relative to p0.
Proof. “if” is immediate from Proposition 1. To see “only if”, consider a best sepa-
rable allocation ρ that is strongly neologism-proof. As a best separable allocation, ρ
is q0-feasible for all beliefs q0. Hence, it solves problem (5) by Proposition 1. QED
Proposition 4 can also be used to understand when restrictions on the class of
mechanisms available to the principal, often made in applied models, are with loss of
generality. For instance, a best separable allocation will be selected if the principal
is restricted to offer a mechanism in which she is not a player herself; if a best
separable allocation is dominated given the prior or some other belief, it is not strongly
neologism-proof. Similarly, if an equilibrium allocation in a semi-separating or a
pooling equilibrium of an informed principal game with a restricted set of mechanisms
is dominated given some belief, e.g., the belief that put the entire mass on the set of
separating types, it is not strongly neologism-proof.
Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012) show that a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists
in independent-private-values environments that satisfy a separability condition. In
the appendix, we show that a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists in quasilinear
environments if the type spaces are finite or the environment is linear. In all these
environments, a best separable allocation is a strong solution if and only if it is
strongly neologism-proof.14
Our next results describe a sufficient condition under which the solution of the
informed principal problem is independent of the amount of the agents’ uncertainty
about the principal’s type. It is the following monotonicity condition.
Definition 4. In linear environments, the players’ payoffs are monotonic in types if
and only if15
sai ≥ 0 for all i, a. (13)
A best separable allocation exists in any linear environment. Moreover, if payoffs
are monotonic, then such an allocation satisfies the conditions given in Proposition
3 when F0 is any point belief. Here, for all agents i, z
∗
i puts all its weight on the
lowest type ti. The crucial observation is that the best allocation in fact satisfies the
conditions given in Proposition 3 for arbitrary beliefs F0. Hence, using footnote 10
and Proposition 4, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Consider a linear environment with monotonic payoffs. Then any
best separable allocation is ex-ante optimal and strongly-neologism proof.
14Myerson (1983, Theorem 2) proves that in any environment with finite type spaces and a finite
outcome space, a strong solution is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of an informed-principal
game where any finite simultaneous-move game form is a feasible mechanism.
15Assuming weakly increasing payoff functions is without loss of generality. If the payoff of some
player i is weakly decreasing for all actions, we can redefine her types as tˆi = −ti and obtain a
weakly increasing payoff function.
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The interpretation of Proposition 5 is simple: if payoffs are monotonic, then the
privacy of the principal’s private information is irrelevant for mechanism design—she
will offer the same mechanism as when her type is commonly known, and she does
not gain from being a player in her own mechanism.
Much of the intuition for the monotonicity condition can be gained from the anal-
ysis of a bilateral trade environment in which a single unit is traded (Myerson and
Satterthwaite, 1983). The optimal mechanism for the seller (principal) if her type
(=cost) is commonly known is a posted price. Hence, the best separable allocation
arises from a collection of these optimal posted prices. Under a regularity condition
on the distribution of the agent’s valuation that requires monotonicity of the virtual
valuation function, a best separable allocation arises from pointwise maximization of
the virtual surplus function. Any ex-ante optimal allocation is a best separable alloca-
tion because it still arises from pointwise maximization of the virtual surplus function
(e.g., Ledyard and Palfrey, 2007). The reason this works is that, whatever type the
principal has, the agent’s equilibrium payoff is always increasing in the agent’s type.
Hence, it is always the same lowest-valuation type of the agent for whom the partici-
pation constraint is binding. In other words, any best separable allocation is ex-ante
optimal because the agent’s payoff is monotonic in her type.
The irrelevance result extends to environments in which the regularity condition
fails because the virtual surplus function is additively separable in types of different
players and multiplicatively separable in the agent’s virtual utility ψi(ti) and the
marginal value of action sai . Consequently, the objective in (9) is additively separable
in the agents’ and the principal’s types and the type-wise maximizer of (9) is not
affected by the belief about the principal’s type.
The irrelevance result has been previously observed in a number of environments
(Myerson 1985, Maskin and Tirole 1990, Tan 1996, Yilankaya 1999, Balestrieri 2008,
Skreta 2009).16 Proposition 5 illustrates the unifying feature underlying these results.
7. Application: Bilateral trade
In this section, we impose more structure on linear environments and use Proposi-
tion 3 to study properties of ex-ante optimal allocations.
We consider a linear-utility environment with one agent (n = 1) and two outcomes
(A = {0, 1}). The type spaces are T0 = T1 = [0, 1]. We assume that the agent’s type
distribution F1 has strictly increasing virtual valuation functions ψ
b(t1) = t1 − (1 −
F1(t1))/f1(t1) and ψ
s(t1) = t1 + F1(t1)/f1(t1).
Any probability distribution on A = {0, 1} can be described by the probability
α ∈ [0, 1] of action 1. Let 0 < α < 1 denote the probability of action 1 upon
disagreement. The disagreement payoffs are normalized to 0 and player i’s (i = 0, 1)
valuation function is given by vi(a, ti) = s
a
i ti, where
sa0 = 1a=0 − (1− α), sa1 = 1a=1 − α.
16A related result is Nishimura (2012) in an environment with generalized private values
(Mylovanov and Tro¨ger 2012).
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Observe that 0 < α < 1 implies that s0i and s
1
i have different signs and, therefore, the
payoffs are non-monotonic in type.
Applications. Bilateral exchange. Our primary application is bilateral exchange:
the set of collective actions A = {0, 1} indicates who gets assigned one unit of an in-
divisible good. A player’s type represents her valuation of the good, the disagreement
outcome is the good is assigned to the agent with probability α and to the principal
with probability 1 − α, and payoffs are written such that each player’s payoff from
the disagreement outcome is normalized to 0.
Procurement. Fleckinger (2007) considers a non-linear procurement environment
with countervailing incentives (Lewis and Sappington 1989, Jehiel, Moldovanu, and
Stacchetti 1999, Jullien 2000). Our model captures its linear version. The agent can
produce a good. The fixed costs of production are decreasing in the agent’s type,
while the marginal costs are increasing in the agent’s type. We can express the fixed
and the marginal costs respectively as C0−αt1 and qt1, where q ∈ [0, 1] is the amount
of production, the agent’s total cost can be written as C0 + (q−α)t1. Since we allow
for randomization on A = {0, 1}, the agent’s payoff is equivalent to that in the above
model up to constant C0. The principal’s valuation function is equal to qt0. While
in this setting the principal’s payoff is different from that in bilateral exchange, the
characterization of ex-ante optimal allocation in Proposition 6 continues to hold.
Renegotiation of a labor contract. The principal is a company and the agent is a
union. The disagreement outcome α represents the amount of labor union members
are required to supply to the firm per existing contract. There is an exogenous shock
to the economy affecting the value of labor for the firm and the union; the realized
values of labor are the parties private information. The total amount of labor is
normalized to 1, and the transfer represents a net change in wage over the current
contract.
Priceline. The principal is a seller and the agent is a buyer. The seller is a monopolist
who sells hotel nights. There are two locations. Action a ∈ {0, 1} indicates the
location of the hotel given to the agent. The types capture relative valuations of the
two locations. If the agent rejects the contract, he goes to the market in which he
expects to find a hotel in the first location with probability α.
In what follows, we use the partnership dissolution interpretation of the model.
That is, the environment is the standard two-party divisible-good exchange setting of
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that one party is designated
as the principal and, as in Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), the disagreement
outcome reflects the share of the good owned by each party (the disagreement outcome
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may also include a side payment which we normalize to 0).17 We allow for non-extreme
property rights.
The following result describes the unique ex-ante optimal allocation, which by
Proposition 2 is an equilibrium outcome of the mechanism-selection game.
Proposition 6. Consider the bilateral-trade environment with non-extreme property
rights. There exists an a.e. unique ex-ante optimal allocation ρ(·) = (α(·),x(·)),
α(t0, t1) =

0 if t0 < t
∗
0, ψ
s(t1) < t0,
1 if t0 < t
∗
0, ψ
s(t1) > t0,
0 if t0 > t
∗
0, ψ
b(t1) < t0,
1 if t0 > t
∗
0, ψ
b(t1) > t0,
where t∗0 = F
−1
0 (α) and x(·) is chosen such that ρ is F0-feasible, and such that the
participation constraints of the agent-types in the interval [(ψs)−1(t∗0), (ψ
b)−1(t∗0)] are
satisfied with equality.
The proof of this result consists of a computation that uses the conditions provided
in Proposition 3; the details are in the Appendix.
Observe that in the ex-ante optimal allocation there is trade with probability 1
and the allocation is deterministic. The outcome is sometimes less efficient than the
disagreement outcome and the entire good is sometimes allocated to the party with
a lower valuation.18
6
- t0
t1
1
1t
∗
0
ψs(t1) = t0
ψb(t1) = t0
α = 0
α = 1
Figure 2. The ex-ante optimal allocation in a bilateral-trade environment.
17Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) shows that dispersed property rights might allow
implementing an ex-post efficient allocation. The informed principal, however, will find it optimal
to distort the allocation away from the efficient one in order to extract higher rents from the agent.
18Figueroa and Skreta (2009) present an environment with type-dependent outside options in
which the optimal mechanism includes overselling. This type of inefficiency is caused by the structure
of the outside option designed by the principal; there is no uncertainty about the principal’s valuation
in their model.
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We compare the ex-ante optimal allocation to the best-separable allocation — the
allocation that the principal would optimally propose if her type were commonly
known. Using methods very similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 6, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 7. Consider the bilateral-trade environment with non-extreme property
rights. There exists an a.e. unique best-separable allocation ρ(·) = (α(·),x(·)),
α(t0, t1) =
 0 if ψ
s(t1) < t0,
1 if ψb(t1) > t0,
α otherwise,
and x(·) is chosen such that, for all t0 ∈ T0, if the agent believes in type t0, then ρ is
incentive-feasible and the participation constraints of the agent-types in the interval
[(ψs)−1(t0), (ψb)−1(t0)] are satisfied with equality.
6
- t0
t1
1
1
ψs(t1) = t0
ψb(t1) = t0
α = α
α = 0
α = 1
Figure 3. The best-separable allocation in a bilateral-trade environment.
Hence, in the best-separable allocation, in contrast to the ex-ante optimal alloca-
tion, each type of the principal fails to trade with the agent with a positive prob-
ability (= F1((ψ
b)−1(t0)) − F1((ψs)−1(t0))) and when the trade occurs it increases
efficiency relative to the disagreement outcome. Because the ex-ante optimal alloca-
tion is strongly neologism-proof, each type of the principal is at least as well off as
in the best-separable allocation. In fact, due to the additional volume of trade in
the ex-ante optimal allocation relative to the best-separable allocation, the envelope
formula (11) implies that the difference u0(t0)− u0(t∗0) between the expected utilities
of type t∗0 and any other type t0 is larger for the ex-ante optimal allocation than for
the best-separable allocation. Therefore:
Corollary 1. In the bilateral-trade environment with non-extreme property rights, all
types t0 6= t∗0 of the principal are strictly better off in the ex-ante optimal allocation
than in the best-separable allocation.
22 TYMOFIY MYLOVANOV AND THOMAS TRO¨GER
Thus, the principal can use the privacy of her information in order to increase her
payoff.
Yilankaya (1999) shows that, if the default allocation of the property rights is
extreme (α = 0 or α = 1), then the uncertainty of the principal’s valuation plays
no role and she will implement a best-separable allocation by making, e.g., a posted
price offer.
The best-separable allocation described in Proposition 7 can be implemented by
using, for each type t0, a bid price of (ψ
s)−1(t0) and an ask price of (ψb)−1(t0).
6
- t0
t1
1
1t
∗
0
α = 0
α = 1
Figure 4. The outcome of the second stage in the three stage mech-
anism implementing the ex-ante optimal allocation in a bilateral-trade
environment.
In contrast, the ex-ante optimal allocation described in Proposition 6 is imple-
mented by a multi-stage mechanism involving a combination of a participation fee for
the agent, a buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices:
In the first stage, the agent pays the participation fee and the good is tentatively al-
located to the agent. In the second stage, the principal decides whether to exercise a
buyout option, in which case the good becomes tentatively allocated to the principal;
this option will be exercised by the types t0 > t
∗
0 of the principal. In the third stage,
given the tentative allocation of the good, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it
fixed-price offer to the agent to sell or buy the good. Hence, the first two stages
consolidate the originally dispersed property rights to the good and allocate the good
either to the principal or the agent, determining whether the principal becomes the
seller or the buyer in the third stage. This mechanism is a generalization of the bid
and ask price mechanism that implements the best separable allocation as well as
a generalization of a posted price mechanism that would be optimal in the environ-
ments with the extreme property rights allocation in which either the principal or the
agent own the good (Williams 1987, Yilankaya 1999).
An important lesson from the bilateral-trade application is that the ex-ante optimal
mechanism differs from the mechanism the principal would offer if her valuation were
commonly known. The intuition for why the principal strictly gains from the privacy
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of her information is as follows. A low-valuation principal will set low prices. Hence,
when dealing with a low-valuation principal, many agent-types will get the good.
Normalizing disagreement payoffs to 0, this implies that the agent’s payoff will be
increasing over a relatively large range of her type space, implying that the agent’s
participation constraint will be binding for relatively low agent types. Vice versa,
when dealing with a high-valuation principal, the agent’s participation constraint will
be binding for relatively high types. In summary, the agent’s participation constraint
will be binding for different types, depending on which principal type the agent is
dealing with.
In an ex-ante optimal allocation, the agent’s participation (and incentive) con-
straints are only required to hold in expectation over the principal’s types. As a
result, in the ex-ante optimal allocation the principal can extract more rents than if
her valuation is commonly known. In the multi-stage mechanism implementing the
ex-ante optimal allocation, at the moment of accepting the mechanism and paying
the participation fee, the agent is kept in the dark about the principal’s type and is
uncertain whether the principal will exercise her buy-out option. The agent’s partic-
ipation constraint can be violated conditional on a particular type of the principal,
but is satisfied in expectation over the principal’s types.
8. Conclusions
This paper considers the informed principal problem in the environments with in-
dependent private values and transferable utility. Our main result is that an informed
principal can implement an allocation that maximizes her ex-ante expected payoff.
This result holds for the environments much more general than those considered in
the literature so far and clarifies which results from the existing literature extend
to more general environments. It also reduces the analysis of a complex informed-
principal signaling game to a linear maximization program that can be solved using
standard methods and, thus, it connects the informed-principal problem to the stan-
dard mechanism design approach.
An important feature of the model that differentiates it from most of the literature
is that the principal can benefit from concealing her private information from the
agents at the moment of contract selection. As an illustration, we consider a bilateral
exchange environment in which the principal is one of the traders. We show that if
the property rights over the good are dispersed among the traders, then the principal
will implement a contract in which she is almost surely better off than if her type
is commonly known. The optimal contract is a combination of a participation fee, a
buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices and, hence, is
a generalization of the posted price that would be optimal if the principal’s valuation
were commonly known.
The ex-ante optimality results relies on the assumptions of private values and quasi-
linear preferences; it is easy to construct examples where this result fails if either of
the assumptions is relaxed. It would be interesting to explore whether our basic
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approach - reformulating the informed principal problem as an appropriate optimiza-
tion problem - extends to other settings, including those with interdependent values,
non-quasilinear preferences, and moral hazard.
9. Appendix
9.1. Proof of Proposition 1. “if” Suppose that ρ is not strongly neologism-proof.
Then there exists a belief q0 and an allocation ρ
′ that q0-dominates ρ. We obtain a
contradiction because
η(q0) ≥
∫
T0
Uρ
′
0 (t0)dq0(t0) >
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0).
“only if”. Consider a strongly neologism-proof allocation ρ = (α(·), x1(·), . . . , xn(·)).
Suppose there exists a belief q0 such that (6) fails, that is
η(q0) >
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0).
By definition of η(q0), there exists a q0-feasible allocation ρ
′ = (α′(·), x′1(·), . . . , x′n(·))
such that ∫
T0
Uρ
′
0 (t0)dq0(t0)−
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0)
def
=  > 0. (14)
Let ρ′′ = (α′(·), x′′1(· · · ), . . . , x′′n(·)), where
x′′1(t) = x
′
1(t)− (Uρ0 (t0)− Uρ
′
0 (t0) + ). (15)
x′′i (t) = x
′
i(t), i = 2, . . . , n.
Then ρ′′ satisfies the q0-incentive and participation constraints for all i 6∈ {0, 1}. Also,
ρ′′ satisfies the q0-incentive and participation constraints for i = 1 because
Uρ
′′,q0
1 (tˆ1, t1) =
∫
T−1
∫
A
v1(a, t1)dα
′(tˆ1, t−1)(a)dq−1(t−1)−
∫
T−1
x′′1(tˆ1, t−1)dq−1(t−1)
(15)
= Uρ
′,q0
1 (tˆ1, t1) +
∫
T0
(Uρ0 (t0)− Uρ
′
0 (t0))dq0(t0) + 
(14)
= Uρ
′,q0
1 (tˆ1, t1).
For all t0 ∈ T0,
Uρ
′′
0 (t0)− Uρ0 (t0)
(15)
= Uρ
′
0 (t0) + (U
ρ
0 (t0)− Uρ
′
0 (t0) + )− Uρ0 (t0) = . (16)
In other words, in ρ′′ every type of the principal is—by the amount —better off than
in ρ. In particular, ρ′′ satisfies the participation constraints for i = 0. However, ρ′′
may violate a incentive constraint for i = 0.
To complete the proof, we show that there exists a belief r0 and an r0-feasible
allocation σ such that, for all t0 ∈ supp(r0),
Uσ0 (t0) ≥ Uρ0 (t0) +
1
2
. (17)
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It follows that ρ is r0-dominated by σ; this contradicts the strong neologism-proofness
of ρ.
Because v0 is equi-continuous and T0 is compact, there exists δ > 0 such that
∀ t0, t′0 ∈ T0, z ∈ Z : if |t0 − t′0| < δ then |u0(z, t0)− u0(z, t′0)| <

8
. (18)
Similarly, because ρ is p0-feasible, U
ρ
0 is uniformly continuous. Hence, there exists
δ′ > 0 such that
∀ t0, t′0 ∈ T0 : if |t0 − t′0| < δ′ then |Uρ0 (t0)− Uρ0 (t′0)| <

8
. (19)
By compactness of T0, there exists a finite partition Dˆ1, . . . , Dˆkˆ of T0 such that
diam(Dˆk) < min{δ, δ′} for all k = 1, . . . , kˆ. By dropping any cell Dˆk with q0(Dˆk) = 0,
we obtain a partitionD1, . . . , Dk of some set Tˆ0 ⊆ T0, where q0(Tˆ0) = 1 and q0(Dk) > 0
for all k = 1, . . . , k.
We construct an allocation ρ′′′ = (α′′′(·),x′′′(·)) from ρ′′ as follows. Given any
t ∈ T with t0 ∈ Dk for some k, we define α′′′(t), and x′′′i (·) (i = 1, . . . , n) by taking
the average over all types in Dk. That is,
α′′′(t)(B) =
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
α′(t′0, t−0)(B)dq0(t
′
0) for all measurable sets B ⊆ A,
x′′′i (t) =
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
x′′i (t
′
0, t−0)dq0(t
′
0).
Given any t0 ∈ T0 \ Tˆ0, let tˆ0 ∈ Tˆ0 be an announcement that is optimal for t0
among all announcements in Tˆ0 in the direct-mechanism interpretation of ρ
′′′; define
ρ′′′(t0, t−0) = ρ′′′(tˆ0, t−0) for all t−0 ∈ T−0. (By construction of ρ′′′, there are at most
k essentially different announcements, so that an optimal one exists.)
By Fubini’s Theorem for transition probabilities, for all k and t0 ∈ Dk,19
u0(ρ
′′′(t), t0) =
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
u0(ρ
′′(t′0, t−0), t0)dq0(t
′
0). (20)
19See, e.g., Bauer, Probability Theory, Ch. 36.
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Hence, letting p denote the product measure of p1, . . . , pn,
Uρ
′′′
0 (t0) =
∫
T−0
u0(ρ
′′′(t), t0)dp(t−0)
(20)
=
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
∫
T−0
u0(ρ
′′(t′0, t−0), t0)dp(t−0)dq0(t
′
0)
(18)
>
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
∫
T−0
(u0(ρ
′′(t′0, t−0), t
′
0)−

8
)dp(t−0)dq0(t′0)
=
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
(Uρ
′′
0 (t
′
0)−

8
)dq0(t
′
0)
(16)
=
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
(Uρ0 (t
′
0) +
7
8
)dq0(t
′
0)
(19)
>
1
q0(Dk)
∫
Dk
(Uρ0 (t0) +
3
4
)dq0(t
′
0)
= Uρ0 (t0) +
3
4
 for all t0 ∈ Tˆ0.
Let I(q0) denote the set of allocations that satisfy the agents’ (but not necessarily
the principal’s) q0-incentive and participation constraints.
We show that ρ′′′ ∈ I(q0). To see this, consider any i = 1, . . . , n and tˆi, ti ∈ Ti.
Then
Uρ
′′′,q0
i (tˆi, ti) =
∫
T−0−i
∫
T0
ui(ρ
′′′(tˆi, t−i), ti)dq0(t0)dp−0−i(t−0−i)
=
∫
T−0−i
∑
k
∫
Dk
ui(ρ
′′′(tˆi, t−i), ti)dq0(t0)dp−0−i(t−0−i)
=
∫
T−0−i
∑
k
q0(Dk)ui(ρ
′′′(tˆi, t−i−0, t0k), ti)dp−0−i(t−0−i),
where we have selected any t0k ∈ Dk for all k. Applying Fubini’s Theorem for
transition probabilities, we conclude that
Uρ
′′′,q0
i (tˆi, ti) =
∫
T−0−i
∑
k
∫
Dk
ui(ρ
′′(tˆi, t−i−0, t′0), ti)dq0(t
′
0)dp−0−i(t−0−i)
=
∫
T−0−i
∫
T0
ui(ρ
′′(tˆi, t−i−0, t′0), ti)dq0(t
′
0)dp−0−i(t−0−i)
= Uρ
′′,q0
i (tˆi, ti).
Hence, ρ′′′ ∈ I(q0) because ρ′′ ∈ I(q0).
Given ρ′′′ and any t0 ∈ T0, let
Dρ
′′′
(t0) = {t′0 ∈ T0 | ∀t−0 : ρ′′′(t′0, t−0) = ρ′′′(t0, t−0)}.
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By construction, the set
Dρ′′′ = {Dρ′′′(t0) | t0 ∈ T0}
is a finite partition of T0 (with at most k cells).
In summary, ρ′′′ ∈ E , where we define
E = {σ | |Dσ| <∞,
∃r0 : σ ∈ I(r0), ∃Tˆ0 : r0(Tˆ0) = 1,
∀t0 ∈ Tˆ0 : Uσ0 (t0)− Uρ0 (t0) >

2
,
∀t0 ∈ T0 \ Tˆ0, t′0 ∈ T0 : Uσ0 (t0) ≥ Uσ0 (t′0, t0),
∀t0 ∈ Tˆ0 : Tˆ0 ∩ arg max
t′0∈T0
Uσ0 (t
′
0, t0) 6= ∅}.
Because E 6= ∅, there exists σ∗ ∈ E with minimal |Dσ∗ |. Let r0 denote a corresponding
belief and let Tˆ0 a corresponding probability-1 set.
Let B∗ denote the set of principal-types for which an incentive constraint is violated
in σ∗. Then B∗ ⊆ Tˆ0 because σ∗ ∈ E . We will show that r0(B∗) = 0.
Suppose that r0(B
∗) > 0. We will show that this contradicts the minimality of
|Dσ∗ |.
Because |Dσ∗| <∞, there exists D′ ∈ Dσ∗ such that r0(B∗ ∩D′) > 0.
By violation of the incentive constraint, there exists D′′ ∈ Dσ∗ \ {D′} such that
r0(B
′′) > 0, where B′′ = {t0 ∈ B∗ ∩D′ | Uσ∗0 (tˆ0, t0) > Uσ
∗
0 (t0) if tˆ0 ∈ D′′}.
We construct a new belief r′0 by
r′0(B) = r0(B ∩B′′)
r0(D
′ ∪D′′)
r0(B′′)
+ r0(B \ {D′ ∪D′′}) for any Borel set B ⊆ T0.
Clearly, r′0 is absolutely continuous relative to r0 (hence, relative to p0). Also,
r′0(Tˆ
′
0) = 1, where Tˆ
′
0 = B
′′ ∪ (Tˆ0 \ (D′ ∪D′′)). (21)
We construct an allocation σ′ = (β(·),y(·)) from σ∗ = (β∗(·),y∗(·)) as follows.
Given any t ∈ T with t0 ∈ B′′, we define β(t), and yi(·) (i = 1, . . . , n) by taking
the average over all types in D′ ∪D′′. That is, for all measurable sets B ⊆ A,
β(t)(B) =
r0(D
′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)β
∗(t′0, t−0)(B) +
r0(D
′′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)β
∗(t′′0, t−0)(B),
yi(t) =
r0(D
′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)y
∗
i (t
′
0, t−0) +
r0(D
′′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)y
∗
i (t
′′
0, t−0),
where we have picked any t′0 ∈ D′ and t′′0 ∈ D′′.
Given any t ∈ T with t0 ∈ Tˆ0 \ (D′ ∪ D′′), we define σ′(t) = σ∗(t). For all
t ∈ T with t0 6∈ Tˆ ′0, define σ′(t) by letting type t0 announce, in the direct-mechanism
interpretation of σ′, whatever type she finds optimal in Tˆ ′0. Then
|Dσ′ | ≤ |Dσ∗ \ {D′, D′′}|+ 1 < |Dσ∗ |.
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We will show now that σ′ ∈ E , yielding a contradiction to the minimality of |Dσ∗ |.
First we show that
σ′ ∈ I(r′0). (22)
Consider any i = 1, . . . , n and tˆi, ti ∈ Ti. Then
U
σ′,r′0
i (tˆi, ti) =
∫
T−0−i
∫
Tˆ0
ui(σ
′(tˆi, t−i), ti)dr′0(t0)dp−0−i(t−0−i)
=
∫
T−0−i
∫
Tˆ0\(D′∪D′′)
ui(σ
∗(tˆi, t−i), ti)dr0(t0)dp−0−i(t−0−i)
+
∫
T−0−i
∫
B′′
ui(σ
′(tˆi, t−i), ti)dr′0(t0)dp−0−i(t−0−i). (23)
Picking any tˇ0 ∈ B′′, and applying Fubini’s theorem for transition probabilities,∫
B′′
ui(σ
′(tˆi, t−i), ti)dr′0(t0) = ui(σ
′(tˆi, tˇ0, t−0−i), ti)r′0(B
′′)
=
(
r0(D
′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)ui(σ
∗(tˆi, t′0, t−0−i), ti) +
r0(D
′′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)ui(σ
∗(tˆi, t′′0, t−0−i), ti)
)
r′0(B
′′)
= r0(D
′)ui(σ∗(tˆi, t′0, t−0−i), ti) + r0(D
′′)ui(σ∗(tˆi, t′′0, t−0−i), ti)
=
∫
D′∪D′′
ui(σ
′(tˆi, t−i), ti)dr0(t0).
Plugging this into (23) yields
U
σ′,r′0
i (tˆi, ti) = U
σ∗,r0
i (tˆi, ti).
This implies (22) because σ∗ ∈ I(r0).
Next we show that, for all t0 ∈ Tˆ ′0,
Uσ
′
0 (t0)− Uρ0 (t0) >

2
. (24)
First consider t0 ∈ Tˆ0 \ (D′ ∪D′′). Then Uσ′0 (t0) = Uσ∗0 (t0), so (24) is immediate from
σ∗ ∈ E and from Tˆ ′0 ⊆ Tˆ0.
For all t0 ∈ B′′, (24) holds because
Uσ
′
0 (t0) =
r0(D
′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)U
σ∗
0 (t0) +
r0(D
′′)
r0(D′ ∪D′′)U
σ∗
0 (t
′′
0, t0) > U
σ∗
0 (t0).
This completes the proof that σ′ ∈ E , thereby contradicting the minimality of |Dσ∗|.
We conclude that r0(B
∗) = 0.
Given any t ∈ T with t0 6∈ B∗, we define σ(t) = σ∗(t). For all t ∈ T with t0 ∈ B∗,
we define σ(t) by letting type t0 announce, in the direct-mechanism interpretation of
σ∗, whatever type she finds optimal in T0 \ B∗, or assign the disagreement outcome
if t0 prefers that.
By construction, the principal’s incentive constraints are satisfied for σ. Also, the
agents’ r0-incentive and participation constraints are satisfied because σ(t) equals
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σ∗(t) for a r0-probability-1 set of principal-types, and because these constraints are
satisfied for σ∗.
By construction, (17) holds for all t0 ∈ T0\B∗. By continuity of Uσ0 (·), (17) extends
to all t0 ∈ supp(r0). In particular, the principal’s participation constraint is satisfied
for all types in supp(r0). By construction, the same holds for all types not in supp(r0).
Hence, σ is r0-feasible. This completes the proof. QED
9.2. Some additional implications of Proposition 1 . At several points in our
analysis, it is useful to consider a simpler variant of the principal’s ex-ante problem.
An allocation ρ is called q0-agent-feasible if, for all agents i ≥ 1, the q0-incentive
constraints (3) and the q0-participation constraints (4) are satisfied. That is, in an
agent-feasible allocation the principal’s incentive and participation constraints may
be violated. Let η˜(q0) denote the supremum value of the principal’s relaxed q0-ex-ante
problem
max
ρ q0-agent feasible
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0). (25)
Technically, the relaxed ex-ante problem is often easier to solve than the standard
ex-ante problem. Obviously, η˜(q0) ≥ η(q0).
From the proof of Proposition 1 it is clear that the characterization continues to
hold when all ex-ante optimizations are replaced by relaxed ex-ante optimizations.
Corollary 2. A p0-feasible allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if and only if
η˜(q0) ≤
∫
T0
Uρ0 (t0)dq0(t0) for all q0 absolutely continuous rel. to p0. (26)
Thus, η(p0) = η˜(p0) in any environment in which a strongly neologism-proof allocation
exists.
Another corollary provides a sufficient condition for an allocation to be strongly
neologism-proof; it follows from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1. This
result is useful towards characterizing ex-ante optimal allocations in linear environ-
ments (Proposition 3).
Corollary 3. If a p0-feasible allocation is not strongly neologism-proof, then it is
strictly q0-dominated for some belief q0 that is absolutely continuous with respect to
p0.
This corollary implies that the set of strongly neologism-proof principal-payoff vec-
tors is always closed and is helpful in proving the existence of strongly neologism-proof
allocations in environments with finite type spaces (Proposition 8).
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9.3. Existence of strongly neologism-proof allocations. In this section, we use
the results of Section 9.2 together with the existence result from Mylovanov and
Tro¨ger (2012) in order to show that a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists in
any environment with finite type spaces that satisfies weak technical assumptions,
and in any linear-utility environment.
9.3.1. Existence in environments with finite type spaces. In Mylovanov and Tro¨ger
(2012) we prove the existence of a strongly neologism-proof allocation in environments
with finite type spaces under otherwise rather weak assumptions.20 We now extend
the existence result to quasi-linear environments in which the set of collective actions,
A, is compact. We make the assumption of separability that was introduced in
Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012); it requires that there exists an allocation such that the
incentive and participation constraints of all types of all agents are satisfied as strict
inequalities.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the type spaces T0, . . . , Tn are finite, that A is a compact
metric space, the valuation functions v0, . . . , vn are continuous, and separability holds.
Then a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists.
The proof has the following steps. First, we provide an upper bound λ for the
absolute value of the interim expected payment of any type of any player in any
incentive-feasible allocation. Then we show that there exists a number κ such that
any scheme of interim expected payments that can occur in a q0-feasible allocation
at all can also be obtained from a payment scheme that involves payments at most κ
times as large (in absolute value) as the largest interim expected payment of any type
of any player. We approximate the outcome space of the quasilinear environment
with a sequence of outcome spaces with larger and larger finite bounds on payments.
These environments have compact outcome spaces, so that strongly neologism-proof
allocations exist by Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012). Moreover, we can assume that
payments in these allocations are bounded by κλ. Hence, the sequence of strongly
neologism-proof allocations has a convergent subsequence. Using Corollary 3, we show
that the subsequence limit is strongly neologism-proof in the quasilinear environment.
The proof or Proposition 8 relies on two lemmas. Given any allocation ρ(·) =
(α(·),x(·)) and any belief q0 about the principal’s type, the interim expected payment
function of any player i is denoted
xρ,q0i (ti) =
∫
T−i
xi(ti, t−i)dq−i(t−i).
Lemma 1. Suppose that A is a compact metric space, and the valuation functions
v0, . . . , vn are continuous.
20As observed by Maskin and Tirole (1990), once can consider a fictitious economy in which
the principal-types trade amounts of slack allowed for the various constraints. Any competitive
equilibrium in this fictitious economy corresponds to an allocation that is a strongly neologism-
proof equilibrium allocation of the mechanism-selection game. The proof in Mylovanov and Tro¨ger
(2012) employs this idea and, consequently, the existence proofs in this paper are indirectly based
on that approach.
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Then, for all beliefs q0, in any q0-feasible allocation, the absolute value of the interim
expected payment of any type of any player is smaller than
λ = (n+ 4) max
i,a,ti
|vi(a, ti)|.
Proof. Let v = maxi,a,ti |vi(a, ti)| denote an upper bound for the absolute value of the
valuation of any action for any type of any player.
By (4), each player’s q0-ex-ante expected payoff is bounded below by 0. On the
other hand, the sum of the players’ q0-ex-ante expected payoffs is bounded above by
(n+ 1)v because payments cancel. Hence,
0 ≤
∫
Ti
Uρ,q0i (ti)dqi(ti) ≤ (n+ 1)v for all i,
where we define qi = pi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Turning to interim expected payoffs,
|Uρ,q0i (ti, t′i)− Uρ,q0i (ti, ti)| ≤ max
a∈A
|vi(a, t′i)− vi(a, ti)| ≤ 2v. (27)
Hence,
Uρ,q0i (ti) ≤ Uρ,q0i (ti, t′i) + 2v
(3)
≤ Uρ,q0i (t′i) + 2v.
Thus,
Uρ,q0i (ti) ≤
∫
Ti
Uρ,q0i (t
′
i)dqi(t
′
i) + 2v ≤ (n+ 3)v.
Because any player’s interim payment can differ from her interim payoff by at most
v, we obtain the desired bound. This completes the proof.
With finite type spaces, both the space of payment schemes L = IR|T|n and the
space of interim expected payment schemes L = IR|T0|+···+|Tn| are finite-dimensional
vector spaces. Endow both spaces with the max-norm. We define the linear map
φq0 : L → L, x(·) 7→ (xρ,q00 (·), . . . , xρ,qnn (·)).
The following lemma says that there exists a number κ such that any scheme of
interim expected payments that can occur in a q0-feasible allocation at all can also be
obtained from a payment scheme that involves payments at most κ times as large (in
absolute value) as the largest interim expected payment of any type of any player.
Lemma 2. Suppose that T0, . . . , Tn are finite. Consider any belief q0. There exists a
number κ such that, for every x(·) ∈ L, there exists x(·) ∈ L such that φq0(x(·)) = x(·)
and ||x(·)|| ≤ κ||x(·)||.
Proof. The set φq0(L) is a finite-dimensional vector space, hence a Banach space (with
the norm induced by the max-norm in L), and φq0 maps onto that space. Hence, the
claim is immediate from the open mapping theorem in functional analysis.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider any sequence of payment bounds (λl) such that
λl → ∞. From Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012), for each l, there exists an allocation
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ρl that is strongly neologism-proof in the environment with payment bound λl. By
Lemma 2 and Lemma 1 (with q0 = p0), w.l.o.g., all these allocations use payments
that are bounded by the same number κλ. Hence, the sequence of payment schemes
in the sequence ρl is bounded in the max-norm. Hence, there exists a convergent
subsequence with limit ρ∗ (in the dimension of the probability measures on collective
actions, the convergence is meant as a weak convergence).
As a limit of p0-feasible allocations, ρ
∗ is p0-feasible. Suppose that ρ∗ is not strongly
neologism-proof. By Corollary 3, ρ∗ is strictly q0-dominated by some allocation ρ′,
for some belief q0.
If l is sufficiently large, then ρ′ is a feasible allocation in the environment with
payment bound λl (w.l.o.g. by Lemma 2 and Lemma 1).
Moreover, if l is sufficiently large, then ρl is strictly q0-dominated by ρ
′ because ρl
approximates ρ∗. This contradicts the fact that ρl is strongly neologism-proof in the
environment with payment bound λl. QED
9.3.2. Existence in linear-utility environments. The following result extends existence
to environments with continuous type spaces. The proof relies on Proposition 8, but
it is not a simple extension and is the most involved result in this paper.
Proposition 9. A strongly neologism-proof allocation exists in any linear-utility en-
vironment.
To prove this, we use the version of our characterization result that refers to the re-
laxed ex-ante problems (Corollary 2). We use the finite-type existence result (Propo-
sition 8) and consider a continuous-type limit.
Using standard envelope arguments (e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995),
Chapter 23), the principal’s relaxed F0-ex-ante problem can be written as
max
u0(t),...,un(t),(s0(t),...,cn(t))∈V
∫
T
u0(t)dF (t),
s.t. si(·) weakly increasing for all i ≥ 1, (28)
ui(ti) = ui(ti) +
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dy for all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Ti, (29)
ui(ti) ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Ti, (30)∫
T
(
n∑
i=0
si(t)ti + ci(t)− ui(t)
)
dF (t) = 0, (31)
Notice that we require the budget to be balanced ex-ante (31). By Bo¨rgers and
Norman (2009), this is equivalent to an ex-post budget balance condition.
Our proof techniques rely on the linearity of the environment. The linearity of the
environment implies the linearity of the envelope formula (29) in si. This linearity,
together with the linearity of the budget balance equation (31) allows us to get well-
behaved limits when we consider the relevant convergent subsequences.
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The proof of Proposition 9 begins with the observation that an ex-ante optimizing
principal who implements any vector (sˆ0, . . . , sˆn) will combine this with a vector
(cˆ0, . . . , cˆn) that has a minimal sum
∑
i cˆi, so that she can charge the largest payments.
Hence, we can work with a simplified V in which (sˆ0, . . . , sˆn) uniquely determines
(cˆ0, . . . , cˆn), and we can ignore the vector (cˆ0, . . . , cˆn) in the following.
We define a sequence m = 1, 2, . . . of finer and finer finite-type approximations
of the linear-utility environment. Each of these environments m can be shown to
be separable, so that a strongly neologism-proof allocation ρm exists by Proposi-
tion 8. We use the notation smi (·) and umi (·) to refer to the components of ρm.
We extend each allocation ρm to the original continuous type spaces by letting the
intermediate types make optimal type announcements in the direct-mechanism inter-
pretation. For each player i, the sequence of interim-averages (smi (·))m=1,2,... has an
almost-everywhere convergent subsequence by Helly’s selection theorem (let sˆi(·) de-
note the limit), and the interim-averages (umi (·))m=1,2,... have a uniformly convergent
subsequence by Arzela-Ascoli’s theorem (let uˆi(·) denote the limit). The sequence
(smi (·))m=1,2,... has a weakly convergent subsequence by Alaoglu’s theorem. For the
weak limits s∗i (·) (i = 0, . . . , n) one can compute the interim averages s∗i (·). The
crucial step is to show that s∗i (·) = sˆi(·). Once we have that, we know that s∗i (·) is
weakly increasing and we can use the envelope theorem to define the interim averages
u∗i (·) and a corresponding limit allocation ρ∗. Then one shows that u∗i (·) = uˆi(·). This
implies that the monotonicity conditions (28), the participation constraints (30), and
the budget balance condition (31) hold in the limit ρ∗.
To verify the condition of Corollary 2, we suppose that (26) fails. Thus, there
exists a belief G0 absolutely continuous relative to F0, and a G0-feasible allocation
ρ′ with a higher G0-ex-ante expected payoff for the principal than ρ∗. We consider
the sequence of finite-type-spaces environments m = 1, 2, . . . with beliefs Gm0 that
approximate G0.
For each m, we partition the space of continuous type profiles into cells that corre-
spond to the discrete type profiles in the environment m. We construct an allocation
ρ′m by taking the average of ρ′ in each cell, and by adding correction terms to the
payments so that ρ′m satisfies the agents’ (not necessarily the principal’s) incentive
and participation constraints, as well as the budget balance condition, with respect
to the belief Gm0 . We show that the correction terms vanish as m → ∞. Thus, if
m is large, then the Gm0 -ex-ante expectation of ρ
′m is larger than the Gm0 -ex-ante
expectation of ρm. This contradicts the fact that ρm is strongly neologism-proof for
all m and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 9. For a probability-1 set of type profiles t, a solution to the
unconstrained F0-ex-ante problem will implement an outcome that puts probability
0 on any action a ∈ A such that
∃b ∈ A, (sa0, . . . , san) = (sb0, . . . , sbn),
n∑
i=0
cai <
n∑
i=0
cbi . (32)
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(Otherwise, the principal could always implement b instead of a and extract larger
payments from the agents.)
Moreover, if instead
∑n
i=0 c
a
i =
∑n
i=0 c
b
i in (32), then either a or b may be used
without changing the interim expected utility ui(ti) of any type ti of any player i.
Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume A is such that, for all a ∈ A,
the vector sa = (sa0, . . . , s
a
n) uniquely determines the vector c
a = (ca0, . . . , c
a
n) = Φ(s
a).
Extending Φ linearly to the convex hull S of {sa|a ∈ A}, we have
V = {(sˆ, cˆ) ∈ IR2n+2 | sˆ ∈ S, cˆ = Φ(sˆ)}.
For all players i = 0, . . . , n, naturals m = 1, 2, . . . , and k = 1, . . . ,m, let Cmi (k) =
[F−1i ((k − 1)/m), F−1i (k/m)) and tm,ki = EFi [ti | ti ∈ Cmi (k)]. Define the finite type
space
Tmi = {tm,1i , . . . , tm,mi }
and let Fmi be the c.d.f. for the uniform distribution on T
m
i .
In the following, we will use the quantile functions F−1i (qi) = min{ti ∈ Ti | Fi(ti) ≥
qi} (qi ∈ [0, 1]); define (Fmi )−1 analogously. Let F−1(q) = (F−10 (q0), . . . , F−1n (qn)) for
all q = (q0, . . . , qn) ∈ [0, 1]n+1; define (Fm)−1 analogously. Then
| F−1i (qi)− (Fmi )−1(qi) | ≤
1
m ·minti∈Ti fi(ti)
def
= δmi . (33)
Next we show that each of the discrete environments just defined is separable in the
sense of Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012). For all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Tmi , and a, b ∈ A, define
pa,bi (ti) =
{
ti−ti
ti−ti if s
a
i ≥ sbi ,
ti−ti
ti−ti otherwise.
Define a function α(t) for all t ∈ Tm by the following randomization: select any
number i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with equal probability (= 1/n), then choose action ai with
probability (1/n)
∑n
j=1 p
ai,bi
j (tj) and choose bi with the remaining probability, where
we use the notation ai, bi from (2).
By construction, pai,bij (tj) is strictly increasing in tj if agent j weakly prefers ai to
bi, and is strictly decreasing if agent j weakly prefers bi to ai. Hence, for any agent i,
type ti ∈ Tmi , and t−i, as ti increases, the randomized action α(t) shifts probability
from less preferred actions to more preferred actions. Thus, using (2), the function
sˆi(t) =
∫
A
sai dα(t)(a)
is strictly increasing in ti, for all t−i. Hence, we can define payments such that all
agents’ incentive constraints are satisfied with strict inequality. By adding constant
payments we can guarantee that, in addition, all agents’ participation constraints are
satisfied with strict inequality, showing separability.
Because A is finite, it is trivially compact and the valuation functions are con-
tinuous. Hence, by Proposition 8, for each of the discrete-type-space environments
constructed above (m = 1, 2, . . . ), there exists a strongly neologism-proof allocation
ρm(t) = (um0 (t), . . . , u
m
n (t), s
m
0 (t), . . . , c
m
n (t))
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that is defined for all t ∈ Tm = Tm0 × · · · × Tmn .
We extend ρm to all t ∈ T by assuming that, in the direct-mechanism interpretation
of ρm, any type ti ∈ (tm,ki , tm,k+1i ) makes an optimal type announcement from the set
{tm,ki , tm,k+1i }, any type ti > tm,mi announces the type tm,mi , and any type ti < tm,1i
announces the type tm,1i .
Then the functions
smi (ti) =
∫
T−i
smi (t)dF
m
−i(t−i), (i ≥ 0, ti ∈ Ti)
are weakly increasing on Ti. Moreover, defining
umi (ti) =
∫
T−i
umi (t)dF
m
−i(t−i),
the envelope formula holds on Ti, that is,
umi (ti) = u
m
i (ti) +
∫ ti
ti
smi (y)dy for all i ≥ 0, ti ∈ Ti. (34)
Observe that this formula includes the principal i = 0.
From (34), for all m, i,
|umi (ti)− umi (t′i)| ≤ max
a
|sai | · |ti − t′i| (ti, t′i ∈ Ti).
Hence, the family of functions (umi )m=1,2,... is equicontinuous. Moreover, by Lemma
1, it is uniformly bounded. Hence, by Arzela and Ascoli’s Theorem, there exists a
subsequence m′ such that
max
ti∈Ti
|um′i (ti)− uˆ∗i (ti)| → 0 (35)
for some continuous function uˆ∗i ; i.e., the subsequence converges uniformly.
For all i ≥ 0, the composite function smi ◦ (Fm)−1 belongs to L2([0, 1]n+1). The
sequence (smi ◦(Fm)−1)m=1,2... is ||· ||2 -bounded (for instance, maxa∈A |sai | is a bound).
Hence, by Alaoglu’s Theorem, there exists a subsequence m′ such that
sm
′
i ◦ (Fm
′
)−1 →weakly h∗i (36)
for some h∗i ∈ L2([0, 1]n+1). Define
h
∗
i (qi) =
∫
[0,1]n
h∗i (q)dq−i.
Define
s∗i (t) = h
∗
i (F0(t0), . . . , Fn(tn)), (t ∈ T ).
Define
s∗i (ti) =
∫
T−i
s∗i (t)dF−i(t−i).
(At this point, is it not yet clear whether s∗i is a weakly increasing function.)
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Note that
s∗i (F
−1
i (qi)) = h
∗
i (qi). (37)
Because the functions smi are weakly increasing, Helly’s selection theorem implies the
existence of a subsequence m′ such that
sm
′
i (ti)→ sˆ∗i (ti) Lebesgue-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. (38)
for some sˆ∗i ∈ L2(Ti). This convergence translates into the quantile space:21
sm
′
i (F
−1
i (qi))→ sˆ∗i (F−1i (qi)) Lebesgue-a.e. qi ∈ [0, 1]. (39)
Because the functions smi ◦Fmi are weakly increasing, Helly’s selection theorem implies
the existence of a subsequence m′ such that
sm
′
i ((F
m′
i )
−1(qi))→ hˆ∗i (qi) Lebesgue-a.e. qi ∈ [0, 1]. (40)
for some hˆ∗i ∈ L2([0, 1]).
From now on we will work with a subsequence m′ such that (35), (36), (38), and
(40) hold.
First we show that
sm
′
i ◦ (Fm
′
i )
−1 →weakly h
∗
i . (41)
To see this, notice that, for all g ∈ L2([0, 1]),∫ 1
0
sm
′
i ((F
m′
i )
−1(qi))g(qi)dqi =
∫
[0,1]n+1
sm
′
i ◦ (Fm
′
)−1(q)g(qi)dq
(36)→
∫
[0,1]n+1
h∗i (q)g(qi)dq
=
∫ 1
0
h
∗
i (qi)g(qi)dqi.
Using (40) and (41),
hˆ∗i (qi) = h
∗
i (qi) Lebesgue-a.e. qi ∈ [0, 1]. (42)
21In order to be able to move between quantile space and type space, it is important that an
“Lebesgue-a.e. property” in one space translates into an “Lebesgue-a.e. property” in the other space.
This follows from the assumption of positive densities. In particular, consider any set Lebesgue
measurable set X ⊆ Ti and Q = {qi|F−1i (qi) ∈ X}. Then
Pr[Q] =
∫ 1
0
1F−1i (qi)∈Xdqi =
∫
Ti
1ti∈XdFi(ti) =
∫
X
fi(ti)dti.
Hence, Q has Lebesgue-measure 0 if and only if X has Lebesgue-measure 0.
MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL 37
Let δ > 0. For all m′ large enough such that δm
′
i < δ,
22∫ 1
0
∣∣∣sm′i (F−1i (qi))− sm′i ((Fm′i )−1(qi))∣∣∣ dqi (43)
(33)
≤
∫ 1
0
max{sm′i (F−1i (qi))− sm
′
i ((Fi)
−1(qi)− δ), sm′i ((Fi)−1(qi) + δ)− sm
′
i (F
−1
i (qi))}dqi
≤
∫ 1
0
(sm
′
i (F
−1
i (qi))− sm
′
i ((Fi)
−1(qi)− δ))dqi +
∫ 1
0
(sm
′
i ((Fi)
−1(qi) + δ)− sm′i (F−1i (qi)))dqi
(39)→
∫ 1
0
∣∣sˆ∗i (F−1i (qi))− sˆ∗i ((Fi)−1(qi)− δ)∣∣ dqi + ∣∣sˆ∗i (F−1i (qi) + δ)− sˆ∗i ((Fi)−1(qi))∣∣ dqi
=
∫
Ti
|sˆ∗i (ti)− sˆ∗i (ti − δ)| fi(ti)dti +
∫
Ti
|sˆ∗i (ti + δ)− sˆ∗i (ti)| fi(ti)dti → 0 as δ → 0.
(The limits in the last line have this reason: sˆ∗i is weakly increasing, thus is contin-
uous Lebesgue-a.e., implying that the family of functions kδ(ti) = sˆ
∗
i (ti) − sˆ∗i (ti − δ)
converges to 0 Lebesgue-a.e. ti as δ → 0.)
Taking the limit m′ →∞ in (43), we conclude that
sˆ∗i (F
−1
i (qi)) = hˆ
∗
i (qi) Lebesgue-a.e. qi ∈ [0, 1].
Combining this with (42), we conclude that
sˆ∗i (F
−1
i (qi)) = h
∗
i (qi) Lebesgue-a.e. qi ∈ [0, 1].
Transforming back into type space and using (37), we have
sˆ∗i (ti) = s
∗
i (ti) Lebesgue-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. (44)
For any t ∈ T, define
(c∗0(t), . . . , c
∗
n(t)) = Φ(s
∗
0(t), . . . , s
∗
n(t)).
Define u∗0(t), . . . , u
∗
n(t) via payments such that
u∗i (t) = uˆ
∗
i (ti) +
∫ ti
ti
s∗i (y)dy for all i ≥ 0, t ∈ T. (45)
This completes the definition of the allocation
ρ∗ = (u∗0(·), . . . , u∗n(·), s∗0(·), . . . , c∗n(·)).
It remains to show that ρ∗ is strongly neologism-proof.
First we show that ρ∗ is F0-feasible.
22Extend the functions sm
′
i and sˆ
∗
i constantly to the left and to the right of Ti in this computation.
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Because all functions s∗0, . . . , s
∗
n are weakly increasing by (44), the envelope condi-
tion (45) guarantees that all players’ incentive constraints are satisfied. Moreover,
lim
m′
max
ti∈Ti
|um′i (ti)− u∗i (ti)| = lim
m′
max
ti∈Ti
∫ ti
ti
| sm′i (y)− s∗i (y) | dy
≤ lim
m′
∫ ti
ti
| sm′i (y)− s∗i (y) | dy
(38),(44)
= 0. (46)
Hence, because, for all m and all players i, the allocation ρm satisfies the participation
constraints for all types in Tmi , the allocation ρ
∗ satisfies player i’s participation
constraints for all types in Ti.
Because weak convergence is preserved under each component of the affine map
Φ = (Φ0, . . . ,Φn), (36) implies that
cm
′
i ◦ (Fm
′
)−1 = Φi ◦
(
sm
′
0 ◦ (Fm
′
)−1, . . . , sm
′
n ◦ (Fm
′
)−1
)
→weakly Φi ◦
(
s∗0 ◦ F−1, . . . , s∗n ◦ F−1
)
= c∗i ◦ F−1.
This allows us to verify the budget-balance condition (31) for ρ∗, as follows:
0 =
∫
T
(
n∑
i=0
sm
′
i (t)ti + c
m′
i (t)− um
′
i (t)
)
dFm
′
(t)
=
n∑
i=0
∫
[0,1]
sm
′
i ((F
m′
i )
−1(qi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
→s∗i (F−1i (qi))
(Fm
′
i )
−1(qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→F−1i (qi)
dqi +
∫
[0,1]n+1
cm
′
i ((F
m′)−1(q))dq

−
n∑
i=0
um
′
i (ti)dF
m′
i (ti)
(46)→
n∑
i=0
∫
Ti
(s∗i (ti)ti − u∗i (ti)ti)dFi(ti) +
∫
[0,1]n+1
c∗i (F
−1(q))dq
=
∫
T
(
n∑
i=0
s∗i (t)ti + c
∗
i (t)− u∗i (t)
)
dF (t).
It remains to verify the condition stated in Proposition 1. Suppose it fails. Then there
exists a belief G0 absolutely continuous relative to F0 and a G0-feasible allocation
ρ′ = (s′0(·), . . . , u′n(·)) with a higher G0-ex-ante payoff for the principal than ρ∗.
Define Gm0 such that PrGm0 [t
m,k
i ] = G0(F
−1
0 (k/m))−G0(F−10 ((k − 1)/m)). We will
use the shortcuts G = (G0, F−0) and Gm = (Gm0 , F
m
−0).
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For allm, we define an allocation ρ′m = (s′0
m(·), . . . , u′nm(·)): for all tm = (tm,k00 , . . . , tm,knn )
(ki ∈ {1, . . . ,m}),
s′i
m
(tm) = EG[s
′
i(t) | ∀i : ti ∈ Cmi (ki)],
c′i
m
(tm) = EG[c
′
i(t) | ∀i : ti ∈ Cmi (ki)],
u′i
m
(tm) = EG[u
′
i(t) | ∀i : ti ∈ Cmi (ki)] + 1i=0m0 − 1i≥1mi (tm,ki ),
where m0 and 
m
i (t
m,k
i ) are defined below.
For all i ≥ 1, m, and k, let
γmi (t
m,k
i ) = m
∫ (k−1)/m
0
(∫ F−1i (qi+ 1m )
F−1i (qi)
s′i(y)dy
−
(
F−1i
(
qi +
1
m
)
− F−1i (qi)
)
m
∫ F−1i (qi+ 1m )
F−1i (qi)
s′i(y)fi(y)dy
)
dqi
and
mi (t
m,k
i ) = γ
m
i (t
m,k
i )−max
k′
|γmi (tm,k
′
i )| ≤ 0.
Then
|γmi (tm,ki )| ≤ m
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣F−1i (qi + 1m
)
− F−1i (qi)
∣∣∣∣
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ F−1i (qi+ 1m)
F−1i (qi)
s′i(y)dy
F−1i
(
qi +
1
m
)− F−1i (qi) −
∫ F−1i (qi+ 1m)
F−1i (qi)
s′i(y)fi(y)dy
1/m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ dqi
= m
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣F−1i (qi + 1m
)
− F−1i (qi)
∣∣∣∣ · |σ1(qi)− σ2(qi)| dqi,
where σ1(qi), σ2(qi) ∈ [s′i(qi), s′i(qi + 1m)] because s′i is weakly increasing. Therefore,
|γmi (tm,ki )| ≤ m
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣F−1i (qi + 1m
)
− F−1i (qi)
∣∣∣∣ · (s′i(qi + 1m
)
− s′i(qi)
)
dqi
≤ 1
minti∈Ti fi(ti)
∫ 1
0
(
s′i
(
qi +
1
m
)
− s′i(qi)
)
dqi → 0 as m→∞.
For all i and m, define a function φmi : Ti → Tmi such that φmi (ti) = tm,ki for all
ti ∈ Cmi (k). Observe that φmi (ti)→ ti as m→∞ for all ti and hence
m0
def
=
∫
T
n∑
i=0
s′i(t)(ti − φmi (ti))dG(t) +
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
mi (t
m,k
i )
m
→ 0.
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This completes the definition of ρ′m. By construction, for all i ≥ 1 and tm,ki ∈ Tmi ,
s′i
m
(tm,ki )
def
=
∫
T−i
s′i
m
(tm,ki , t−i)dG
m
−i(t−i)
=
1
PrFi(C
k,m
i )
∫
Cm,ki
∫
T−i
s′i(t)dG−i(t−i)dFi(ti)
= m
∫
Cm,ki
s′i(ti)dFi(ti)
= m
∫ F−1i (k/m)
F−1i ((k−1)/m)
s′i(ti)fi(ti)dti
= m
∫ k/m
(k−1)/m
s′i(F
−1
i (qi))dqi,
and similar for c′i
m
and u′i
m
. In particular, the agents’ participation constraints are
satisfied for ρ′m. To verify the agents’ incentive constraints, notice that, using the
shortcut
∆ = mi (t
m,k+1
i )− mi (tm,ki ) = γmi (tm,k+1i )− γmi (tm,ki ),
we have
u′i
m
(tm,k+1i )− u′i
m
(tm,ki ) = m
∫
Cm,k+1i
u′i(ti)dFi(ti)−m
∫
Cm,ki
u′i(ti)dFi(ti)−∆
= m
∫ (k+1)/m
k/m
u′i(F
−1
i (qi))dqi −m
∫ k/m
(k−1)/m
u′i(F
−1
i (qi))dqi −∆
= m
∫ k/m
(k−1)/m
(
u′i(F
−1
i (qi +
1
m
))− u′i(F−1i (qi))
)
dqi −∆
= m
∫ k/m
(k−1)/m
∫ F−1i (qi+ 1m )
F−1i (qi)
s′i(y)dydqi −∆
= m2
∫ k/m
(k−1)/m
(F−1i (qi +
1
m
)− F−1i (qi))
∫ F−1i (qi+ 1m )
F−1i (qi)
s′i(y)fi(y)dydqi.
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Then, by the first mean value theorem for integration, there exists ξi ∈ [(k−1)/m, k/m]
such that
. . . = m2
∫ F−1i (ξi+ 1m )
F−1i (ξi)
s′i(y)fi(y)dy
∫ k/m
(k−1)/m
(F−1i (qi +
1
m
)− F−1i (qi))dqi
=
1
1/m
∫ F−1i (ξi+ 1m )
F−1i (ξi)
s′i(y)fi(y)dy · (tm,k+1i − tm,ki )
=
1
1/m
∫ ξi+ 1m
ξi
s′i(F
−1
i (y))dy · (tm,k+1i − tm,ki ){ ≥ smi (tm,ki )(tm,k+1i − tm,ki )
≤ smi (tm,k+1i )(tm,k+1i − tm,ki ),
showing incentive compatibility.
Moreover, due to the correcting term m0 , the ex-ante budget balance condition for
ρ′ implies that the ex-ante budget balance condition holds for ρ′m. Finally,
max
t0∈Tm0
| u′0
m
(t0)− u′0(t0) | ≤ |m0 |+ 2
m∑
i=1
max
k∈{1,...,m}
|γmi (tm,ki )| → 0 as m→∞.
Hence, the principal’s Gm0 -ex-ante payoff according to (ρ
′)m converges to the princi-
pal’s G0-ex-ante payoff according to ρ
′ as m→∞. This contradicts the fact that ρm
is strongly neologism-proof for all m. QED
9.4. Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 9 and Corollary 2, the solutions to
the principal’s F0-ex-ante problem are precisely the solutions to the principal’s relaxed
F0-ex-ante problem in which the principal’s incentive and participation constraints
are satisfied.
Using (31) to rewrite the objective, the principal’s relaxed F0-ex-ante problem is
to
max
u1(t),...,un(t),(s0(t),...,cn(t))∈V
∫
T
(
n∑
i=0
si(t)ti + ci(t)−
n∑
i=1
ui(t)
)
dF (t),
s.t. si(·) weakly increasing for all i ≥ 1,
ui(ti) = ui(ti) +
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dy for all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Ti,
ui(ti) ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Ti.
Using the virtual valuation functions ψi(ti) = ti − (1 − Fi(ti))/fi(ti) and (29), the
objective of this problem can be rewritten as∫
T
(
s0(t)t0 + c0(t) +
n∑
i=1
si(t)ψi(ti) + ci(t)
)
dF (t)−
n∑
i=1
ui(ti),
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Here, only the lowest-types’ utilities ui = ui(ti) occur. Thus we can define payments
to satisfy (29) in a separate (second) step, and can simplify the maximization problem
as follows:
max
(u1,...,un)∈IRn, (s0(t),...,cn(t))∈V
∫
T
(
s0(t)t0 + c0(t) +
n∑
i=1
si(t)ψi(ti) + ci(t)
)
dF (t)
−
n∑
i=1
ui,
s.t. si(·) weakly increasing for all i ≥ 1, (47)
ui +
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dy ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Ti.
Defining
M = {(s0(·), . . . , cn(·)) | (47)},
we have to
max
(u1,...,un)∈IRn, (s0(·),...,cn(·))∈M
∫
T
(
s0(t)t0 + c0(t) +
n∑
i=1
si(t)ψi(ti) + ci(t)
)
dF (t)
−
n∑
i=1
ui,
s.t. ui +
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dy ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 1, ti ∈ Ti.
Using the Lagrange approach (e.g., Luenberger (1969), Chapter 8), we have to
max
(u1,...,un)∈IRn, (s0(·),...,cn(·))∈M
∫
T
(
s0(t)t0 + c0(t) +
n∑
i=1
si(t)ψi(ti) + ci(t)
)
dF (t)
−
n∑
i=1
ui
+
n∑
i=1
∫
Ti
(
ui +
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dy
)
dz∗i (ti),
where z∗i (i ≥ 1) is a right-continuous and weakly increasing function on Ti such that
n∑
i=1
∫
Ti
(
u∗i +
∫ ti
t∗i
s∗i (y)dy
)
dz∗i (ti) = 0, (48)
where (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n, s
∗
0(·), . . . , c∗n(·)) denotes a solution to the maximization problem.
Because the solution value is the same as to the F0-ex-ante optimization problem
(e.g., Luenberger (1969), Chapter 8), we cannot reach arbitrarily high values, implying
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that z∗i (ti) = 1 for all i (otherwise i could be chosen to achieve arbitrarily high values
for the objective).
Hence, u1, . . . , un cancel out and the objective becomes∫
T
(
s0(t)t0 + c0(t) +
n∑
i=1
si(t)ψi(ti) + ci(t)
)
dF (t)
+
n∑
i=1
∫
Ti
∫ ti
ti
si(y)dydz
∗
i (ti),
Using integration by parts, we can rewrite the objective as∫
T
(
s0(t)t0 + c0(t) +
n∑
i=1
si(t)ψ
z∗i
i (ti) + ci(t)
)
dF (t),
By the arguments of Myerson (1981), maximization of this objective is equivalent to
(9), provided that there exists a solution to (9) that belongs to M. The existence of
a solution that belongs to M is argued as follows. Observe that
(s∗0(t), . . . , c
∗
n(t)) ∈ arg max
b∈V
b · d,
where
b = (sˆ0, . . . , cˆn),
d = (t0, ψ
∗
1(t1), . . . , ψ
∗
n(tn), 1, . . . , 1).
If ti becomes larger, one component of d becomes larger, or d remains constant.
Consider the problem to maxb∈V b · dj for two vectors d1, d2 ∈ IRm with d2 = d1 +
(δ, 0, . . . , 0) for some δ > 0. Let bj ∈ arg maxb b · dj for j = 1, 2. Then we claim that
b21 ≥ b11. To see this, consider bˆ ∈ V such that bˆ1 < b11. By optimality of b1, we have
bˆ · d1 ≤ b1 · d1, implying bˆ · d2 < b1 · d2. Hence, bˆ 6∈ arg maxb b · d2, as was to be shown.
Finally, observe that (48) is equivalent to (8). Hence, a solution to the principal’s
relaxed F0-ex-ante problem is characterized by the conditions (8), (9), (10) for i 6= 0,
(11) for i 6= 0, and (12) for i 6= 0. The additional conditions (10), (11), and (12) for
i = 0 are the principal’s incentive and participation constraints. This completes the
characterization.
9.5. Proof of Proposition 6. We make use of the conditions provided in Proposition
3. Observe that
V z
∗
1 ,...,z
∗
n(v, t) = ψ
z∗1
1 (t1)sˆ1 − t0sˆ0.
Condition (9) yields that s1(t) = 1−α if ψz
∗
1
1 (t1) > t0 and s1(t) = −α if ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) < t0.
Therefore,
s1(t1) = F0(ψ
z∗1
1 (t1))− α a.e. t1. (49)
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Let [y
1
, y1] denote the interval of types t1 such that u1(t1) = 0. By the monotonicity
condition (10), if t1 > y1, then s(t1) ≥ 0. In fact, by definition of y1 and the envelope
formula (11),
s1(t1) > 0 if t1 > y1, and s1(t1) < 0 if t1 < y1. (50)
First, we show that y
1
< y1. Suppose that y1 = y1. Then z
∗
1(t1) = 1t1≥y1 by (8),
implying that ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) = ψ
s(t1) if t1 < y1 and ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) = ψ
b(t1) if t1 ≥ y1.
Suppose, furthermore, that y
1
= y1 = t1. Then ψ
z∗1
1 = ψ
b is strictly increasing.
Hence, ψ
z∗1
1 = ψ
b. Hence, for t1 ≈ 0, ψz
∗
1
1 (t1) < 0, implying s1(t1) = −α < 0
by (49). That is, u1 is strictly decreasing at t1 ≈ 0 by (11), a contradiction to
u1(t1) = u1(y1) = 0 and (12). For a similar reason, it cannot be that y1 = y1 = t1.
Thus, suppose that y
1
= y1 ∈ (t1, t1). Because ψz
∗
1
1 jumps downwards at y1, ironing
implies that, for all t1 in an open neighborhood of y1, the function ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) is con-
stant. Hence, by (49) and (10), s1(t1) = const. for all t1 in the open neighborhood,
contradicting (50).
Hence, y
1
< y1. Then s1(t1) = 0 on (y1, y1) by the envelope formula (11). Hence,
using (49) and (50), for a.e. t1,
ψ
z∗1
1 (t1)

> F−10 (α1) if t1 > y1,
= F−10 (α1) if t1 ∈ [y1, y1],
< F−10 (α1) if t1 < y1.
(51)
This extends to all t1 because ψ
z∗1
1 is continuous. Notice that y1 > t1 because otherwise
ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) ≥ ψ
z∗1
1 (t1), but this is impossible because
ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) ≤ ψs(t1) = t1 = 0 < F−10 (α1) = ψ
z∗1
1 (t1).
Similarly, y1 < t1.
From (8), ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) = ψ
s(t1) for all t1 < y1. Hence, because ψ
s is strictly increasing
and using (51),
ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) = ψ
s(t1) for all t1 < y1.
Similarly, because ψb is strictly increasing,
ψ
z∗1
1 (t1) = ψ
b(t1) for all t1 > y1.
Hence, using (51) and the continuity of ψ
z∗1
1 , ψ
s(y
1
) = F−10 (α), implying
y
1
= (ψs)−1(F−10 (α)).
Similarly,
y1 = (ψ
b)−1(F−10 (α)).
This completes the proof.
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